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L Introduction

Suppose the legislature of State Z decides to implement welfare reform
by cooperating with private-sector social service providers. The legislators
have heard about other states that are pursuing cooperative relationships with
private providers, including religious providers, of social services.' For
example, states have contracted with faith-based drug-treatment programs,2

have encouraged churches to mentor low-income families,3 have worked with

private-sector housing programs,4 and have implemented voucher systems for
training and job-placement services. 5 The legislators ofZ know that involving
1. See generally Joe Loconte, The Bully and the Pulpit: A New Modelfor Church-State
Partnerships,POL'Y REV.: J. AM. CIZENSHIP, Nov/Dec. 1998, at 28 (providing examples of
social programs that faith-based community has created); Roy Maynard & Bob Jones IV,
FightingPoverty in Jesus' Name: ... and with TaxpayerFunds?, WORLD, Aug. 15, 1998, at
12 (describing several state social service programs that utilize religious providers); Welfare
InformationNetwork,Faith-Basedlnvolvement(visited Jan. 15,1999) <http'//www.welfareinfo.
org/faithbase.html> (describing involvement of faith-based organizations and conferences held
to explore developing similar programs in following states: Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington). The new relationship between the government and religious organizations often differs from prior cooperative efforts. Compare THE
CENTER FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE & THE CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY'S CENTER FOR LAW AND
RELIGIOUS FREEDoM, A GUIDE TO CHARITABLE CHOICE: THE RULES OF SECTION 104 OF THE
1996 FEDERAL WELFARE LAW GOVERNING STATE COOPERATION WTH FArH-BASED SOCIALSERVICE PROVIDERS 13-14 (1996) [hereinafterA GUIDE TO CHARITABLE CHOICE] (stating that
although government partnerships with nonprofit organizations historically have included
cooperation with religiously affiliated groups, government pressures to minimize religious character have caused charities to create independent, nonprofit subsidiaries to run governmentfunded social services) with Jonathan Friedman, Note, CharitableChoiceand theEstablishment
Clause, 5 GEo. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 103, 104 (1997) (asserting that recent changes allow
religious organizations to provide services "in an openly sectarian way").
2. See George W. Bush, Faith in the Future of Texas (explaining Texas legislation
favorable to cooperation with Bible-based addiction-treatment programs), in Loconte, supra
note 1, at 35. Welfare agencies in Texas have formal financial agreements with 16 faith-based
organizations, nonfinancial agreements with 11 organizations, and informal agreements with
34 organizations. R.G. Ratcliffe, FaithfulHave a Place in Politics,Says Bush, Hous. CHRON.,
Mar. 7, 1999, atAl.
3. See Loconte, supra note 1, at 35 (stating that thousands of congregations work closely
with welfare families to find jobs, to care for children, and even to budget and grocery shop);
Welfare Information Network, supra note 1 (summarizing programs in several states through
which volunteers from congregations "adopt" or mentor low-income families).
4. See Welfare Information Network, supra note 1 (reporting that Georgia city is considering involving faith-based nonprofits in establishing housing programs).
5. See Rich Harp, HelpingPeopleGetBack to Work: Tool ChestAwardsGet National
Attention, HURONDAILY TRm., Mar. 21,1997 (describing "Tool Chest" voucher system for job
training implemented in Thumb Area of Michigan). See generallyANN LORDEMAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING: USING VOUCHERS TO PROVIDE
SERVICES (1997) (describing legislation encouraging vouchers for job training).
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religious, or "faith-based," providers of social services is popular across the
political spectrum.6 Also, members of the legislature have learned that
religious providers are among the most efficient social service providers and
among the most successful at permanently changing lives.'
Instead of contracting directly with an independent provider, State Z
decides to work with private providers by issuing vouchers redeemable with
various social service providers.8 The distinctive characteristic of vouchers
is that the individual beneficiary chooses among various qualified providers,
whereas in a contracting system the government agency chooses the provider.9
The legislators of Z conclude that a voucher system has practical benefits
because it will increase the autonomy ofthe beneficiaries by providing a range
of choices and because a voucher system will reduce costs by creating a competitive market for services.1" Choosing a voucher system over a contracting
6. See STEHENV.MONsMA,THECm, lERFoRPuBcJUSTICE,GOVERNMENT COOPERATONWlTHSoCIALMNISTRIES: HAPPY oRDYsFuNCTIONAL? 1 (1998)(reportingthatincreasing
use of faith-based agencies in addressing social needs is "the hot topic in public policy circles"
and that supporters range from Republican Congressmen to President Clinton and Democratic
state officials); Gore 2000, Remarks asPreparedforDelivery by Vice PresidentAlGore on the
Role of Faith-BasedOrganizations(speech delivered May 24, 1999) (visited Sept. 21, 1999)
<http'//wwwAlGore2000.com/speechesf> [hereinafter Gore Remarks] (promoting "the transformative power of faith-based approaches" to community reform).
7. See A GUIDE TO CHARITABLE CHOICE, supra note 1, at 13-14 (contending that
religious character of organizations is "the very source of their genius and success"); HENRY G.
CISNEROS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HIGHER GROUND: FAITH COMMUNImS AND
COMMUNITY BUILDING 6-12 (1996) (summarizing efforts of faith-based community development); MONSMA, supra note 6, at 13 (asserting that compelling religious organization to
abandon or to segregate religious components of its program might ruin much of its effectiveness); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, AN EVALUATION OF THE TEEN CHALLENGE
TREATMENT PROGRAM 10-11 (1977) (finding Teen Challenge achieved success rates of 70%
to 80% while other drug-treatment programs seldom reached success rate of over 10%); Carl
H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Casefor Governmental Cooperation with Faith-BasedSocial
ServiceProviders,46 EMORY L.J. 1,39 (1997) (asserting success of faith-based providers); John
J. Dilulio, Jr., Jeremiah's Call, PRISM, MarJApr. 1998, at 18, 22-23 (summarizing early
findings of social science studies); Gore Remarks, supra note 6 (asserting that "religious
character... is so often the key to the[ ] effectiveness" of faith-based organizations).
8. See While CongressDebates, Boards Test Vouchers Around the Country, WoRKFORCE ADVISOR, NoviDec. 1997, at 3, 3 [hereinafter WORIFORCE ADVISOR] (contrasting
vouchers with traditional subcontracting for services).
9. See LORDEMAN, supra note 5, at 1 (contrasting voucher system in which individual
chooses services with traditional system in which government agency chooses services);
WORXFORCE ADVISOR, supra note 8, at 3 (explaining that individual can "spend" voucher on
any certified program).
10. See LORDEMAN, supra note 5, at 3 (describing increase in autonomy of beneficiaries,
shift of funds from bureaucracies to clients, and decrease in costs as result of competition);
WORKFORCE ADVISOR, supra note 8, at 3 (asserting that vouchers increase beneficiaries'
choices and at same time reduce costs).
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system also has federal constitutional benefits because the Supreme Court
repeatedly has allowed indirect benefits to flow to religious entities as part of
a neutral program and as the result of the independent choice of private indi-

viduals. 1

But as the state legislature looks further into the state constitutional questions involved, someone mentions a little-known and little-used state constitutional provision that prohibits the use of any public funds to aid a religious
organization or purpose. 2 Research of the state court's interpretation of the
clause, known as the Blaine provision, reveals that Z's state constitution is
even more restrictive than are the federal Constitution's religion clauses; at
times Z's constitution prevents benefits from flowing to religious organizations even whenithe federal Constitution would allow it. 3 In order to comply
with the state constitution, the legislature decides to exclude religious social
service providers from its voucher program.
The legislators of State Z then face the task of reconciling the voucher
program with federal standards. Congress has encouraged states to use independent-sector providers to implement welfare reform and to include religious
providers in those programs.' 4 For example, one provision ofthe Personal Re11. See Rosenberger v. Rector& Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,839 (1995) ("We
have held that the guarantee of neutrality is respected, not offended, when the government,
following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients whose
ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse."); Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993) (upholding "general government program
that distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying... without regard to the sectariannonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the school" (internal quotations omitted)); Witters
v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,487-89 (1986) (finding no Establishment Clause violation in program in which government funds reach religious institution "only
as a result of genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients"); Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983) (upholding program in which "public funds become available [to
parochial schools] only as a result of numerous private choices of individual parents"); infra
note 76 (explaining Supreme Court's distinction between direct and indirect funding).
12. See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (citing and explaining state Blaine provisions).
13. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (giving examples of state court decisions
interpreting state constitutions more restrictively than federal precedents on federal Constitution); see also Esbeck, supra note 7, at 39 (explaining that welfare programs that comply with
First Amendment still could violate state constitutions that contain terms that are more separationist than Establishment Clause).
14. See MONSMA, supra note 6, at I (citing Senator John Ashcroft's "Charitable Choice"
amendment to 1996 welfare act, Senator Dan Coats's "Project for American Renewal," and
Representatives Jim Talent and J.C. Watts's "Community Renewal Project" as examples of
encouraging utilization of faith-based agencies); see also H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-430, at 361
(1995) (commenting on language identical to that found in Charitable Choice provision of
PRWORA and stating that "[i]t is the intent of Congress... to encourage States to involve
religious organizations in the delivery of welfare services to the greatest extent possible").
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sponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) 5
permits states to use contracts and vouchers to involve charitable, religious,
and private organizations in social service programs. 6 This provision, commonly known as "Charitable Choice," explicitly requires that states allow
religious providers to participate on the same basis as other private providers.17 In State Z, the legislators initially fear a conflict between Charitable
Choice's nondiscrimination principle and the state constitution's exclusion of
religious groups." However, Charitable Choice specifically avoids a statutory
conflict between the federal law and state constitutions by allowing the segregation of federal and state funds.' 9 Therefore, if State Z decides to create a
voucher program that distributes federal funds, the federal standard will apply,
but the State can apply its Blaine provision to segregated state funds without
violating the federal statute.2" In light of this, the state legislators decide to
use only state funds and to open the voucher program to all qualified social
service providers except for religious providers.
After reconciling its voucher program both with the state constitutional
standard and with the federal statutory standard, the legislators face one final
question: Willthe federal Constitution allow State Zto exclude religious social
service providers from its program, or does the Constitution itself require that
State Z treat all independent social service providers equally? 2 If the latter,
15. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
16. PRWORA § 104(a)(1),42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1997);see Welfare Information Network, supranote I (reporting that although Charitable Choice has not yet brought about
striking increase in states' utilization of religious social service providers, legislation has
generated much debate); infra Part I.C (discussing Charitable Choice).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(c). A similar Charitable Choice provision appears in the Community Service Block Grant Act of 1998. See Pub. L. No. 105-285, § 679, 112 Stat. 2702, 2749
(1998) (codified at 42 U.S.CA. § 9920 (West Supp. 1999)) (stating that government must
consider religious organizations on same basis as other nongovernmental organizations, provided such action is consistent with Establishment Clause).
18. See infra Part 1.B (explaining Supremacy Clause of United States Constitution and
statutory preemption).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(k); see A GUIDME TO CHAmTABLE CHOICE, supra note 1, at 25
(specifying that administration of segregated federal block-grant funds must comply with principles of § 604a, but state authorities can administer segregated state funds according to more
restrictive state requirements); infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (discussing exemption
of subsection (k)).
20. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (describing different standards for
commingled and segregated state funds).
21.
See infra Part M11
(considering Blaine provisions under Free Speech Clause); infra Part
IV (applying Establishment Clause's principle of neutrality to Blaine provisions); see also infra
note 50 (observing possibility of Free Exercise Clause challenge to Blaine provisions); infra
note 71 (citing allegations of due process and equal protection violations by Blane provision);
cf infra note 72 and accompanying text (explaining that Court never reached federal constitu-
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then the federal Constitution's requirement of equal treatment will preempt

the state constitution's requirement of exclusion.22

Although the above scenario is hypothetical, it is not unforeseeable. Both
including and excluding religious providers in government social service systems raises constitutional questions because ofthe limits that the First Amendment places on the relationship between the government and religion.' The
Establishment, Free Exercise, and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment24 each require neutrality toward religion, adding complexity to states'
abilities to provide varied constitutional protections to their own citizens.2"
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the differences between
federal and state religion clauses; however, it has never addressed the possibility of a conflict between First Amendment principles and a state Blaine provision that excludes a religious group or individual from a general government
program or benefit.2 6
tional issues in Garnettv. Renton School DistrictNo. 403 because federal statute preempted
state constitution). This Note includes only an analysis of the constitutionality of Blaine provisions under the Free Speech Clause's public forum doctrine and under the Establishment
Clause's principle of neutrality. An analysis under the Free Exercise Clause and the Equal Protection Clause exceeds the scope of this Note. For a discussion of these approaches, see Eugene
Volokh, Equal TreatmentIs Not Establishment,13 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETIcS & PUB. POL'Y
341, 365-72 (1999) (arguing that Free Exercise Clause, Free Speech Clause, Establishment
Clause, and Equal Protection Clause mandate equal treatment for religion).
22. See infra note 57 (quoting Supremacy Clause).
23. See The Center for Public Justice, Introductionto WLIAMJ. ToBrN, THE CENTERFOR
PUBUC JUsTIcE, LESSONS ABOUT VOUCHERS FROM FEDERAL CHILD CARE LEGiSLATION at i
(1998) (explaining that service of faith-based charities and religious congregations in public
square is "both suspect and risky" even when constitutional); infratext accompanying notes 9294 (summarizing requirements of First Amendment). Specifically, under the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the First Amendment, a government program must have a secular purpose and
must not have the primary effect of advancing religion. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
222-23 (1997) (asking whether purpose or effect of government action was to advance or to
inhibit religion); infra Part IV.B.1 (explaining Lemon test). At the same time, the government
can neither discriminate against religion nor communicate a message of disfavor toward
religion. See infra note 50 (stating standard of Free Exercise Clause); infra Part fI.B (summarizing free speech standard that forbids discrimination against religious viewpoint); infra Part
IV.B.2 (setting out endorsement test).
24. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech ... ." Id.
25. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845 (1995)
(stating that each separate clause of First Amendment requires neutrality); Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973) ("A proper respect for both
the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels the State to pursue a course of 'neutrality' toward religion."); infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (explaining relationship
between state and federal constitutions).
26. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,489 (1986)
(commenting that state court could consider "far stricter" standard of state constitution on
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This Note examines whether applying the Blaine provisions of state
constitutions to exclude religious providers from state social service voucher
programs violates either the Establishment Clause or the free speech principles
that the Supreme Court has applied in conjunction with the Establishment
Clause. To narrow the discussion, this Note begins with the premise that the
federal Constitution permits the inclusion of religious providers in social
service voucher programs.' Part II summarizes the Blaine provisions of various state constitutions and recognizes that they may exclude religious providers from state-funded social service voucher programs." It also considers the
relationship between state constitutions and the federal statutory standard that
Charitable Choice embodies. 29 Part IEI examines cases in which the United
States Supreme Court has applied a dual analysis, finding both thatthe Establishment Clause permitted inclusion of a religious group on the same basis as
other groups and also that the Free Speech Clause forbade their exclusion.3"
Part IV discusses the Establishment Clause's principle of neutrality.31 Part V
concludes that the Blaine provisions conflict with the Supreme Court's decisions that require neutrality toward religion.32 Therefore, if a state chooses to
use state funds to implement avoucher program involving independent providers of social services, it must apply the same neutral eligibility criteria to all
organizations, including religious social service providers.
ff. Blaine Provisions and Social Service Voucher Programs
A. The Origin and Interpretationof State Blaine Provisions
Religion clauses in state constitutions take several forms.3 3 Many state
remand); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,275 (1981) (citing decision in which state supreme
court held that state constitution required stricter separation of church and state than did federal
Constitution); see also Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 493 U.S. 850, 850
(1989) (denying petition for certiorari after state court prohibited grant under state constitution
that Supreme Court had permitted under federal Constitution); infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text (discussing Widmar and Witters decisions).
27. See supra note 11 (citing cases upholding benefit that flowed to religious organization
as part of neutral program and independent, private choices); infra notes 120-22 (same).
28. See infra Part II (setting forth Blaine provisions of state constitutions, and considering
statutory and constitutional preemption of provisions).
29. See infra Part II.B-C (explaining statutory preemption and how Charitable Choice
avoids conflict with state constitutions).
30. See infra Part Ifl (examining Blaine provisions under neutrality standard of several
Free Speech Clause cases in which Court also found that including religious groups did not
violate Establishment Clause).
31. See infra Part IV (summarizing Establishment Clause's principle of neutrality).
32. See infra Part V (concluding that exclusion of qualified religious providers from state
social service voucher program is unconstitutional).
33. See generallyLinda S. Wendtland, Note, Beyond the EstablishmentClause: Enforcing Separationof Church andState Through State ConstitutionalProvisions,71 VA. L. REV.
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constitutions contain clauses that prohibit public funding of religious institutions and purposes in general 4 or of religious schools in particular." These
provisions parallel the language of the proposed Blaine Amendment to the
federal Constitution, 6 although not all of the state provisions flowed directly
625 (1985) (surveying state constitutions' religion clauses and state courts' interpretations of
them). The religion clauses in state constitutions often are more specific and more detailed than
those in the federal Constitution and may contain several provisions. Id. at 631. Several state
constitutions contain a general prohibition against the establishment of religion, in words that
echo the First Amendment, as well as one or more additional clauses. Id. One type forbids
compulsory attendance at or support of a ministry or a place of worship. Id. at 631-32. A
second type forbids governmental preference for religion. Id. A third type follows the pattern
of the original proposed Blaine Amendment. Compareinfra text accompanying note 38 (quoting
original proposed Blaine Amendment) with infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (summarizing state Blaine provisions).
34. See IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 5 ("[T]he legislature... shall [n]ever make any appropriation, or pay from any public fund or moneys whatever, anything in aid of any church or sectarian
or religious society, or for any sectarian or religious purpose.. . ."); for other state constitutions
prohibiting funding of religious institutions or purposes, see ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12, art. IX,
§ 10; CAL. CONST. art XV!, §5; COLO.CONST. art. V, §34, art. IX, § 7; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3;
GA. CONST. art. L § 2, para. 7; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 3; IND. CONST. art L § 6; MASS. CONST.
amend. art. XVI, § 2; MICH. CONST. art I, § 4; MINN. CONST. art L § 16; Miss. CONST. art.
IV,§ 66; Mo. CONST. art. L § 7, art IE,§ 8; NEB. CONST. art. VII § 11; NEv. CONST. art. XL
§ 10; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83; OKLA. CONST. art II, § 5; OR. CONST. art. I, § 5; PA. CONST. art.
II, § 29; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3; TEX. CONST. art L § 7; UTAH CONST.art. L §4; VA. CONST.
art IV, § 16; WASIL CONST. art., § 11; WIs. CONST. art. I, § 18; WYo. CONST. art , § 19, art.
R11,§ 36; Wendtland, supra note 33, at 632 & n.38 (listing state constitutions that forbid use of
any public funds to aid religious organization or purpose). Four of these state constitutions
explicitly prohibit indirect as well as direct funding. See id.at 632 & n.39 (citing FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 3; Mo. CoNST. art , § 7; MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6; OKLA. CoNST. arLHI,§ 5).
35. See DEL. CONST. art X, § 3 ("No portion of any fund.., shall be appropriated to, or
used by, or in aid of any sectarian, church or denominational school."); for other constitutions
prohibiting funding of religious schools, see ALASKA CoNST. art VII § 1; ARIz. CONsT. art. IX,
§ 10; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 8, art. XVI, § 5; COLO.CONST. art. IX, § 7; HAw. CONST. art X,
§ 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 5; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 3; KY. CoNST. § 189; MCI CoNsT. art.
VIII § 2; MINN. CONST. art XIII, § 2; MIss. CONST. art VIII § 208; MO. CONST. art. IX, §8;
MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6; N.H. CONST. pt H, art 83; N.M. CONST. arL XII, §3; N.Y. CONST.
art. XI, §3; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 5; OHIO CONST. art VI, § 2; PA. CONsT. art aII, § 15; S.C.
CONST. art. XI, § 4; S.D. CONST. art VIII, § 16; TEX. CONST. art VII, § 5(a); UTAH CONST. art
X, § 9; VA. CONST. art VIII, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 4; Wyo. CONST. art. VII, § 8;
Wendtland, supra note 33, at 632-33 & n.40 (listing state constitutions that proscribe state aid,
maintenance, or support of denominational schools).
The purpose of this Note is not to analyze the variations in state religion clauses or their
interpretation by state courts. For further analysis, see generally Frank R. Kemerer, Commentary, State Constitutionsand School Vouchers, 120 EDUC.L. REP. (West) 1 (Oct. 1997), which
examines the application of state religion clauses to school vouchers; Joseph P. Viteritti,
Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the FirstAmendmen4 andStateConstiutionalLaw,21 HARV.
J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 657 (1998), which considers school choice in the context of state and federal
constitutional lavr, and Wendtland, supranote 33, which surveys state religion clauses.
36. See Viteritti, supra note 35, at 659 (describing original proposed Blaine Amendment
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from it. 7 The proposed Blaine Amendment to the federal Constitution stated:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in
any State for the support ofpublic schools, or derived from any public fund
therefor, not any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the
control of any religious sect; nor shall any money so raised or lands so
devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations.
The United States Congress considered the proposed Blaine Amendment in
1876 but failed to pass it.39 However, over thirty states have adopted similar
40
-amendments or incorporated similar provisions into their own constitutions.
State courts have interpreted their constitutions' religion clauses in
several ways.4 1 Some state courts have construed the state religion clauses to
parallel the First Amendment, even though the language of the state and fedand its progeny). Compare infra text accompanying note 38 (quoting proposed Blaine Amendment to federal Constitution) with supra notes 34-35 (providing examples of religion clauses
in state constitutions). For an explanation of the events surrounding the proposed Blaine
Amendment, see generally F. William O'Brien, The Blaine Amendment, 41 U. DET. L.J. 137
(1963).
37. See Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606,624 (Ariz. 1999) (explaining that no recorded
history links proposed Blaine Amendment and Arizona's 1910 constitutional convention);
Steven K. Green, The BlaineAmendment Reconsidered,36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38,43 (1992)
(stating that by 1876, year in which Congress failed to pass proposed Blaine Amendment, 15
states had measures prohibiting public funding of religious schools); Viteritti, supra note 35,
at 674 (reporting that in 1844, New York passed law prohibiting aid to religious schools and
in 1894 added prohibition to state constitution).
38. See Green, supra at 37, at 38 n.2 (1992) (quoting 4 CoNG. REc. 5453 (1876)) (providing text of Representative James G. Blaine's proposal).
39. See Viteritti, supra note 35, at 672 & n.72 (stating that amendment passed in House
but failed by four votes to meet two-thirds majority required in Senate).
40. See Green, supra note 37, at 43 (stating that by 1890, 29 states had constitutional
prohibitions against transfer of public funds); Michael J. Karman, Rethinking the Civil Rights
and Civil LibertiesRevolutions, 82 VA. L. REv. 1, 53 (1996) (reporting that by 1915, over 30
states had passed "Baby Blaine" amendments (citing L Frank Way, The Death of the Christian
Nation: The Judiciaryand Church-StateRelations, 29 J.CHURC- & ST. 509, 523 (1987)));
supra notes 34-35 (highlighting state constitutions that forbid governmental aid to religious
organizations and to religious schools). For example, some states incorporated the provisions
by amendment, Green, supra note 37, at 43, and many territories incorporated Blaine-like
provisions into their constitutions in order to gain congressional approval for statehood, Viteritti, supra note 35, at 673; Joseph P. Viteritti, ChoosingEquality: ReligiousFreedom and
EducationalOpportunity Under ConstitutionalFederalism, 15 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 113,
146-47 (1996). This Note refers to all state constitutional provisions that parallel the proposed
Blaine Amendment as "Blaine provisions."
41.
See infra notes 42-53 and accompanying text (summarizing interpretation of state
Blaine provisions); see also G. Alan Tarr, UnderstandingStateConstitutions,65 TEMP. L. REV.
1169, 1170 (1992) (asserting that state constitutions contain features that distinguish them from
federal Constitution and therefore merit separate theories of interpretation).
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eral constitutions differs.42 Other states explicitly have rejected the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment when construing their own religion clauses.43 Some states even have reached the opposite

conclusion under their state constitutions from the conclusion that the Supreme
Court has reached when applying the federal Constitution."

The language

42. See, e.g., People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 305 N.E.2d 129, 130 (Ill. 1973) (finding
state constitution's prohibition of any public funding in aid of religious purpose or school to be
identical to restrictions of First Amendment); Heritage Village Church & Missionary Fellowship, Inc. v. State, 263 S.E.2d 726, 730 n.1 (N.C. 1980) (turning to jurisprudence of First
Amendment's Establishment Clause for analytic guidance despite difference in terminology of
state constitution); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 620 (Wise. 1998) (stating that court
"interpret[s] and appl[ies] the benefits clause [of the state constitution] ... in light of the United
States Supreme Court cases interpreting the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment");
Kemerer, supra note 35, at 27 (observing that some state courts equate state and federal
establishment clauses despite considerable variation in wording); Wendtland, supra note 33,
at 634-35 & 635 n.51 (reporting that 11 states' courts declared their constitutions' church-state
provisions no broader than federal Constitution's).
43. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24 (stating that state constitutional rights are independent of federal Constitution); Epeldi v. Engelking, 488 P.2d 860, 865-66 (Idaho 1971) (asserting
that framers of state constitution intended clearer separation of church and state than in federal
Constitution and that interpretation of state constitution differs from that of federal); Board of
Educ. for Indep. Sch. Dist No. 52 v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911, 913 (Okla. 1963) (stating that
Everson decision, which allowed funding of busing to parochial schools, does not change effect
of state constitution); Dickman v. School Dist. No. 62C, 366 P.2d 533, 545 (Or. 1961) (declaring that even if Supreme Court's interpretation of federal Constitution were not distinguishable
in this case, state court still would interpret state constitution to reach opposite conclusion);
Kemerer, supra note 35, at 4-20 (surveying states with restrictive constitutional provisions);
Wendtland, supra note 33, at 634 & n.49 (stating that approximately 20 states do not follow
Supreme Court's interpretation of religious freedom); id. at 643-46 (summarizing state decisions
rejecting all federal standards).
Neither Wendfland nor Kemerer explicitly distinguished state constitutional provisions
patterned after the proposed Blaine Amendment Also, both Wendtland and Kemerer focused
on the implications of these state constitutional provisions for school vouchers. The question
of school vouchers differs slightly from the question of social service vouchers because many
states specifically address sectarian education in their religion clauses, supra note 35, but few
state constitutions specifically mention charities, and none of them distinguish religious charities. See COLO. CONST. art. V, §34 (proscribing appropriation for charitable, educational, or
benevolent purpose to corporation not under absolute control of state); MASS. CONST. amend.
art. XVIII, § 2 (prohibiting appropriation of public money for charitable or religious undertaking that is not publicly owned and under exclusive control of public officers); MONT. CONST.
art. V, § 11(5) (forbidding appropriation for religious, charitable, educational, or benevolent
purpose to any private individual or association not under control of state); VA. CoNsT. art. IV,
§ 16 (banning appropriation of public funds by General Assembly to any charitable institution
not owned or controlled by Commonwealth, but permitting General Assembly to authorize
political subdivisions to appropriate funds to any charitable institution or association); WYo.
CONST. art. IR § 36 (disallowing appropriation for charitable, educational, or benevolent
purpose to corporation not under absolute control of state).
44. See, e.g., Conrad v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 667, 678 (Colo. 1983)
(finding that plaintiff had established prima facie case that public display of nativity scene
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that state courts interpret as more restrictive than the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment almost always parallels the language of the
proposed Blaine Amendment.4"
State courts have applied Blaine provisions to various forms of funding
for religious groups.46 Typically, state court decisions address aidto parochial
schools; they often forbid the inclusion of parochial schools in programs that
contribute textbooks to various schools or the provision of public busing to
parochial school students on the same basis as to other students.47 The Washington Supreme Court applied its state religion clause to a program of educational grants for the blind and excluded a blind student studying to be a minister.48 Recently, the application of Blaine provisions has arisen inthe context
of school choice.49 The application of the Blaine provisions to parochial
violated state constitution and implying that contrary opinion under federal Constitution would
not change outcome under state constitution); Epeldi v. Engelking, 488 P.2d 860, 865-66 (Idaho
1971) (rejecting child benefit theory and denying public funds for transportation of students to
parochial schools); Bloom v. School Comm. of Springfield, 379 N.E.2d 578, 581-83 (Mass.
1978) (declaring that although Supreme Court upheld direct textbook loans to parochial school
students, state constitution does not distinguish between religious and secular purpose of aid and
therefore program violated state constitution); Viteritti, supranote 40, at 149 (asserting that state
courts' interpretations of state religion clauses do not always follow Supreme Court's guidance);
Wendtland, supranote 33, at 634 (stating that most states that have not followed Supreme Court's
reasoning under First Amendment have issued directly contrary decisions under state provisions).
45. See Wendfland, supra note 33, at 639-41 (finding that state constitutions barring aid
to religious institutions in general or to sectarian schools in particular are more predictive of
state court activism than are clauses forbidding state to compel person to support any ministry
or forbidding governmental preference toward religion). Although Wendtland does not
specifically label the clauses "Blaine provisions," the language that Wendfland finds to be the
crucial variable in predicting an activist decision that prohibits aid to a religious purpose, organization, or school, id. at 638, parallels the language of the proposed Blaine Amendment.
Wendtland reported that only the California and Colorado courts have based activist decisions
on the more general clauses, id. at 640, that do not parallel the proposed Blaine Amendment.
Wendtland also observed that "state provisions that expressly proscribe 'indirect' aid do not
seem to result in more activist decisions than those that merely proscribe aid." Id. at 641.
46. See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (providing examples of programs challenged under state religion clauses).
47. See Wendtland, supra note 33, at 635-36 (explaining role of public aid to sectarian
schools in defining religion clauses). Several states forbid public transportation of students to
parochial schools. See id.at 636 & n.54 (citing, for example, McVey v. Hawkins, 258 S.W.2d
927 (Mo. 1953); Board of Educ. for Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 52 v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911 (Okla.
1963); Visser v. Nooksack Valley Seh. Dist., 207 P.2d 198 (Wash. 1949)). Several states prohibit direct textbook loans. See id.at 636 & n.55 (citing, for example, Bloom v. School Comm.
of Springfield, 379 N.E.2d 578 (Mass. 1978); In re Advisory Opinion, 228 N.W.2d 772 (Mich.
1975); Dickman v. School Dist. No. 62C, 366 P.2d 533 (Or. 1961)).
48. See Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119,1121 (Wash. 1989) (finding that state payment towards a religious course of study "falls precisely within the clear language of the state constitutional prohibition").
49. See Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 617-21 (Ariz. 1999) (finding that tax credit
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school aid reflects the history of the original proposed Blaine Amendment and
the specific language in many state constitutions, ° but Blaine provisions have
arisen in other contexts as well. For example, a New York court applied its
state constitution to refuse state funding of a sectarian orphanage.51 An
Indiana court cited the state establishment clause when it invalidated a program reimbursing private religious missions for providing emergency shelter.52
Litigants in Washington used the state Blaine provision in an attempt to
invalidate bonds that the state issued for religiously affiliated hospitals. 3 In
light of the broad language of the Blaine provisions, it is likely that some of

them will present a barrier to the inclusion of religious providers in state
social service voucher programs, even when the programs comply with the
54
federal Constitution.
for school tuition donations did not violate federal Establishment Clause or state constitution's
prohibitions against applying appropriations to religious worship or to aid church, or private or
sectarian school); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 620-22 & 620 n.20 (Wisc. 1998)
(finding that amended school choice program that included religious schools violated neither
federal Establishment Clause nor state constitution's prohibition of using money "from the
treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries" (quoting
WIs. CONST. art. I, § 18)); Viteritti, supra note 35, at 659 (asserting that legal opposition to
school choice centers around Blaine provisions).
50. See Green, supra note 37, at 41-42 (asserting that motivation of Protestants in promoting Blaine provisions was to preserve their influence over public school curricula and at
same time to prevent public funds from reaching Catholic schools); Viteritti, supra note 35, at
670 (reporting Protestant fear of "Catholic menace" in school policy); id. at 659 ("In fact, the
Blaine Amendment is a remnant of nineteenth-century religious bigotry promulgated by nativist
political leaders who were alarmed by the growth of immigrant populations and who had a
particular disdain for Catholics.").
A Free Exercise Clause argument exists against the Blaine provisions because of their
discriminatory purpose. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 532 (1993) ("At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the
law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct
because it is undertaken for religious reasons."). The Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise
Clause, the Free Speech Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause each "require the same outcome: the neutral treatment of religious speech." Brief for Pet'rs at 49, Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (No. 94-329). However, the application of the
Free Exercise Clause and the Equal Protection Clause exceeds the scope of this Note.
51. See Viteritti, supranote 40, at 150 n.203 (citing Sargent v. Board of Educ. of Rochester, 69 N.E. 722 (N.Y. 1904)).
52. See Center Township v. Coe, 572 N.E.2d 1350, 1360 (Ind. 1991) (finding that
contracting with religious missions violated state constitution's provision that prohibited taking
"money... from the treasury, for the benefit of any religious or theological institution" (citing
IN. CoNST. art I, § 6)).
53. See Wendtland, supra note 33, at 645 & n.103 (citing Washington Health Care
Facilities Auth. v. Spellman, 633 P.2d 866 (Wash. 1981)) (explaining that Washington court
averted decision by ruling that bonds were not public money or property).
54. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-430, at 361 (1995) (stating that Congress included
subsection (k) in Charitable Choice provision so that religious organizations could fully partici-
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Differences among state constitutional standards are "anatural outgrowth
of American federalism.""5 States are free to grant their citizens greater rights
than those that the United States Constitution guarantees.56 However, a federal court will not uphold a state constitution or a state statute that conflicts
with the United States Constitution or with the federal law.5 7 Therefore, were
there a conflict, federal law or the federal Constitution would preempt a state
Blaine provision.
B. FederalStatutory Preemption
Garnett v. Renton School DistrictNo. 4035" presents an example of a
situation in which a federal statute superseded a state constitution's Blaine
provision. 9 In Garnett, a school district refused to grant a student religious
pate in programs, despite state constitutional provisions prohibiting expenditure of public funds
in or by sectarian institutions).
55. Viteritti, supra note 35, at 680.
56. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (confirming state's
"sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those
conferred by the Federal Constitution"); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714,719 (1975) (expressing
that state law can impose greater restrictions on police activity than does federal Constitution);
State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn. 1985) ("It is axiomatic that a state supreme court
may interpret its own state constitution to offer greater protection of individual rights than does
the federal constitution."). In a law review article, Justice Brennan wrote:
[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections
of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties,
their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's
interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to
the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law
- for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the ProtectionofIndividualRights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489,491 (1977).
57. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding."); see also Hoppock v. Twin Falls Sch. Dist. No. 411,772 F.
Supp. 1160, 1163 (D. Idaho 1991) ("A state constitutional grant is adequate ifit is more protective of a right than an analogous provision of the federal constitution - provided that protection
of the state constitutional right does not infringe a competing federal guarantee."); Eugene C.
Bjorklun, Commentary, The EqualAccessAct and State Constitutions: The FinalChapter, 86
EDUC. L. REP. (West) 1, 6 (Dec. 1993) ("It does not matter that a state constitution prohibits the
practice. If it is mandated and upheld as constitutional, it must take precedence over the state
constitution under the Supremacy Clause.").
58. 987 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1993).
59. See Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403,987 F.2d 641,646 (9th Cir. 1993) (deciding
that state law must yield to student group's federal right that Equal Access Act created). In
Garnett,the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether the Equal
Access Act (EAA) preempted the Washington Constitution. Id. at 644. School officials claimed
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club permission to meet on school grounds before school hours. 6' The school
district contended that allowing the meeting would violate both the Washington
Constitution and the United States Constitution.61 The student group sued the
school, arguing that the Equal Access Act (EAA)62 required the school to allow
their meeting on the same basis as the school's other noncurriculum-related
clubs. 63 The District Court initially found for the school district, agreeing that
the Washington Constitution governed the decision.' The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the statutory right created by the
EAA preempted the state constitutional provision that prohibited the religious
club from accessing school grounds. 5 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.66
The Garnett decision and others reaching the same conclusion6 7 have
implications far beyond the EAA.'s The implications expand even past the
realm of education because, although the EAA applies only to schools, it
mirrors the equal access standard of Widmar v. Vincent,69 a federal constituthat allowing a religious club to meet on school grounds during noninstructional time violated
the state and federal constitutions. Id.at 643. Students argued that the EAA required that the
school allow them access and that the Free Speech, Free Exercise, Free Association, Equal
Protection, and Due Process Clauses also protected their right to meet. Id. The Garnettcourt
explained that under the EAA, if a public secondary school allows any noncurriculum-related
student group to meet, it may not deny other clubs access on the basis of the content of their
speech. Id. at 644 (citing Board of Educ. of the Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226,236(1990)). Thus, even though the Washington Constitution prohibited student religious groups from meeting on school grounds, the court found that the EAA created a federal right
for religious student groups and that the state constitution must defer to the statutory right. Id.
60. See id. at 643 (explaining school district's denial of students' request for permission
to form religious club).
61. See id. (explaining schools district's defense). The Washington Constitution states:
'No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship,
exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment." WAS.L CONST. art. I,
§ 11. Another provision specifies: "All schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by
the public funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or influence." Id. art. IX, § 4.
62. Equal Access Act (EAA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1994).
63. See Garnett,987 F.2d at 643 (summarizing students' EAA claim).
64. Id. at 643-44.
65. See id.at 646 (finding that state law must yield to EAA).
66. Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403,510 U.S. 819 (1993).
67. See Ceniceros v. Board of Trustees of San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 878,
883 (9th Cir. 1997) (maintaining that rights that EAA created "exceed, and therefore supersede"
rights under California Constitution); Hoppock v. Twin Falls Sch. Dist. No. 411, 772 F. Supp.
1160, 1164 (D. Idaho 1991) (finding that under Supremacy Clause, Idaho Constitution does not
prevent application of EAA).
68. See Bjorklun, supra note 57, at 8 ("If the Ninth Circuit Court's decision in Garnett
stands and becomes the settled law on the issue, its significance will lie not so much in regard
to equal access, but for the precedent it may set in other church-state issues in education.").
69. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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tional standard that defines the protections of free speech and applies to all
government actions."° Althoughthe plaintiffs in Garnettchallenged the federal
constitutionality of Washington's state constitutional provision,: 7' the Garnett
court never reached that question because it based its decision on the federal
statute. 2 In contrast to the EAA, the federal statute allowing for the creation
of state social service vouchers intentionally avoids a similar conflict between

its statutory principle of nondiscrimination and the Blaine provisions' exclusion of religious organizations.7"

C. CharitableChoice's Avoidance of Statutory Preemption
The purpose of the Charitable Choice provision of the PRWORA is to
allow a religious organization to participate in providing welfare services on
the same basis as any other nongovernmental provider without affecting the
religious character of the organization or burdening the religious freedom of
70. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270-75 (1981) (requiring that school allow
religious student group access to public forum because equal access does not violate Establishment Clause); see also Board of Educ. of the Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226, 235 (1990) ("In 1984 [through the EAA], Congress extended the reasoning of Widmar to
public secondary schools."); Esbeck, supra note 7, at 22 (asserting that Congress enacted EAA
to extend equal access right of Widmar to secondary schools). In applying the EAA, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed: "Wlith respect to the federal Constitution, the Supreme Court has recently addressed strikingly similar Establishment Clause challenges." Ceniceros, 106 F.3d at 882 (citing Lamb's Chapel v. CenterMoriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Mergens,496 U.S. 226; Widmar, 454 U.S. 263). But see Mergens,
496 U.S. at 242 (clarifying that Congress's use of phrase "limited public forum" did not incorporate Widmar'sdefinition of"limited public forum").
In Widmar, the Supreme Court addressed the issue ofwhether a state university could deny
a registered student group access to facilities to hold religious meetings once the university had
made its facilities generally available to registered student groups. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 264-65.
The Widmar Court applied the standard of review for content-based exclusions in a public
forum: The regulation must serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly drawn to achieve
that end. Id. at 270. Acknowledging that the university had a compelling interest in fulfilling
its obligations under the United States Constitution, the Court nevertheless found that an "equal
access" policy would not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 271. The open forum clearly
had a secular purpose and avoided entanglement with religion even if it did not exclude religious
activities. Id. at 271-72. Moreover, the incidental benefits received by religious groups would
not have the primary effect of advancing religion. Id. at 273. In conclusion, the Widmar Court
asserted that in light of the limitations of the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses, the state's
interest in securing greater separation of church and state was not compelling. Id. at 276.
71. See Garnett,987 F.2d at 643 (stating that students also argued that forbidding them
to meet on school grounds violated Free Speech, Free Exercise, Free Association, Equal Protection, and Due Process Clauses of federal Constitution).
72. See id. at 643 n.1, 646 (stating that because court reached its decision on statutory
grounds, court did not address federal constitutional claims).
73. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (explaining how subsection (k) of Charitable Choice avoids statutory conflict).
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the beneficiaries. 4 The Charitable Choice provision not only allows the
inclusion of religious providers, it also explicitly prohibits religious discrimination or the exclusion of religious providers when a state chooses to work
with independent providers of social services. 5 Under one subsection of
Charitable Choice, states may provide individual beneficiaries of social
services with certificates, vouchers, or other forms of disbursement redeemable with eligible service providers.7 6 The Charitable Choice provision covers
74. See PRWORA § 104(b), 42 U.S.C. § 604a(b) (Supp. IV 1997) (stating purpose of
Charitable Choice). The Charitable Choice provision protects the free exercise rights of the
religious provider by allowing the organization to display religious art, id. § 604a(d)(2)(B), by
forbidding government interference in the independence and governance of the organization,
id. § 604a(d)(2)(A), and by maintaining the organization's exemption from employment
discrimination standards, id. § 604a(f). Compare id. §§ 604a(d), (f) (guaranteeing religious
freedom of recipient religious organizations) with STEVEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND
SECULAR MIX: RELIGIOUS NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC MONEY 81-99, 128-29,
154-61 (1996) (surveying government pressures and disputes regarding religious character and
expression of religious service-providers who receive government assistance).
The provisions protect the welfare recipient's free exercise rights by forbidding discrimination by the religious provider, 42 U.S.C. § 604a(g), and by requiring the state to provide an
alternative provider upon request, id. § 604a(e)(1). Although the objecting beneficiary has a
right to an alternative provider who is not of that particular religion, the beneficiary does not
have a right to a provider of his or her own faith. See A GUIDE TO CHARITABLE CHOICE,
supra note 1, at 24 n.13 (stating that subsection (e)(1) simply requires alternative provider, not
one sharing beneficiary's faith).
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 604a(a)(1), (c); see A GUIDE TO CHARITABLE CHOICE, supra note 1, at
18 (observing that state may decide to limit social service providers to government agencies,
but once state decides to use private-sector providers, it cannot bar religious providers from
eligibility); Esbeck, supra note 7, at 9 (same); cf Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (stating that although state can choose not to create substantive right, once
state creates property right, deprivation of that right must comply with federal constitutional due
process standards (citation omitted)).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(1)(B). In addition to allowing states to establish voucher programs, Charitable Choice also allows states to contract with charitable, religious, or private
organizations to provide welfare services. Id. § 604a(a)(1)(A).
The Supreme Court has distinguished direct and indirect funding. Characteristics of
indirect funding include that the benefit is available under neutral eligibility criteria, without
regard to the sectarian or nonsectarian nature of the institution; that the funds flow through an
independent party, and that the funds reach the institution only as a result of private decisionmaking. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,223-26 (1997) (summarizing Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993)). The Court has so widely accepted the constitutionality of indirect
funding of religion that even the dissenters in Rosenberger agreed that benefits given to
individuals on a religion-neutral basis and then used to aid religious activity do not violate the
Establishment Clause. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
873-75 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (characterizing funding as direct and therefore unconstitutional); Esbeck, supranote 7, at 7 (commenting that even more liberal Justices of Supreme Court
agree with distinction between direct and indirect assistance). This Note begins with the
assumption that the Establishment Clause permits the redemption of social service vouchers with
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a variety of government-funded social service programs. 7
In anticipation of the constitutional issues raised by allowing religious
providers to participate in the government program, the Charitable Choice
provision stipulates that the implementation of these programs must conform
to the Establishment Clause.78 The legislative history indicates that Congress
specifically considered Establishment Clause case law when it drafted the
voucher provision.79 In addition to addressing federal constitutional concerns,
Charitable Choice also recognizes and addresses the potential state constitutional barrier to supplying social services through religious providers."0 In
religious providers. See supra note 11 (citing cases upholding benefit that flowed to religious
organization as part of neutral program and independent, private choices); infra notes 120-22
(same); infra text accompanying notes 197, 199 (distinguishing action that Establishment Clause
permits from action that Establishment Clause requires). Because direct funding of religious
organizations by contracts raises threshold questions separate from indirect funding through
vouchers, this Note addresses only the indirect funding of religious social service providers.
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(2) (applying provision to Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) program, to Supplementary Security Income (SS1) program, and to food
stamps and Medicaid programs); A GUIDE TO CHARITABLE CHOICE, supra note 1, at 3-4, 16-17
(describing programs to which Charitable Choice applies). Charitable Choice allows vouchers
for the following services, among others: subsidized jobs and community service positions, jobskills training, food pantries, maternity homes, abstinence education, drug and alcohol treatment
programs, health clinics, AIDS hospices, adolescent counseling centers, battered women's
shelters, literacy and English-as-a-second-language programs, dispute resolution and legal aid
centers, and retreat centers for youths and adults. See Carl H. Esbeck, The Neutral Treatment
of Religion and Faith-BasedSocialService Providers: CharitableChoice andIts Critics,in
WELFARE REFORiM & FAriH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS 173, 200 n.33 (Derek Davis & Barry
Hankins eds., 1999) (listing programs to which Charitable Choice applies); A GUIDE TO CHARITABLE CHOICE, supra note 1, at 17 (same).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(c). The statute specifies:
In the event a State exercises its authority under subsection (a) of this section,
religious organizations are eligible, on the same basis as any other private organization, as contractors to provide assistance, or to accept certificates, vouchers, or
other forms of disbursement, under any program described in subsection (a)(2) of
this section so long as the programs are implemented consistent with the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.
Id.
79. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-430, at 361 (1995) (explaining that Supreme Court has
found that allowing individual to redeem government-provided voucher with religious entity
does not violate Establishment Clause, despite indirect benefit to religion, provided that individual has genuine choice (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist, 509 U.S. 1 (1993);
Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388 (1983))); A GUIDETO CHARITABLE CHOICE, supra note 1, at 1 (stating that Charitable
Choice clarifies and codifies constitutional requirements); Memorandum from Senator John
Asheroft's Office,Ashcroft CharitableChoiceProvisionTriumphs in New Welfare Reform Law
(Oct. 1996) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review) (asserting that Charitable Choice
"embodies existing U.S. Supreme Court case precedents").
80. See PRWORA § 104(k), 42 U.S.C. §604a(k) (Supp. IV 1997) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to preempt any provision of a State constitution or State statute that pro-
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order to avoid a conflict between the state constitutionalprohibitionagainst
including these groups and thefederal statutory requirementto include religious providers,8 Charitable Choice specifically allows the segregation of federal and state funds in welfare programs.8 2 In essence, a state cannot exclude
qualified religious providers from programs financed by federal funds or by
commingled state and federal funds because the nondiscrimination principle
applies to these funds.83 Segregated state funds, however, are free from the
statutory nondiscrimination requirement.84 Nevertheless, in avoiding the
statutory conflict, Charitable Choice opens the door to a constitutional conflict
between the federal Constitution and the state Blaine provisions, another confrontation that could lead to the preemption of the Blaine provisions." If a
state decides to use independent providers of welfare services but excludes all
religious providers of welfare services from the state program, the state still
risks violating the federal constitutional prohibitions against viewpoint discrimination and against hostility toward religion.8"
hibits or restricts the expenditure of State funds in or by religious organizations."); H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 104-430, at 361 (1995) (stating that Congress did not intend subsection (k) to require
segregation of state and federal funds but rather to allow states to segregate funds so that religious organizations could fully participate in programs, despite state constitutional provisions
prohibiting expenditure of public funds in or by sectarian institutions); supra notes 34-35 and
accompanying text (summarizing state constitutions' Blaine provisions).
81. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (providing that under Supremacy Clause, Constitution
and congressional laws preempt state and local laws); supra Part ThE (addressing federal
statutory preemption of state provisions); infra Part ll.D (considering federal constitutional
preemption of state provisions).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(k); see Friedman, supra note 1, at 106 (explaining that states that
commingle state and federal funds must comply with standards of Charitable Choice in disbursing any funds); cf Mark Greenberg, HHS Policy Guidance on Maintenance of Effor
Assistance, andPenalties:Summary andDiscussion,4GEO. J. ONFIG-ING POVERTY315,317
(1997) (explaining that if family receives assistance through combined federal and state moneys,
federal TANF rules apply, but if state chooses to segregate funds, then state funds are free from
certain TANF requirements).
83. See A GUIDE TO CHARITABLE CHOICE, supra note 1, at 25 (explaining coverage of
Charitable Choice principles); cf TOBIN, supranote 23, at 7-8 (describing provisions in Child
Care and Development Block Grant Amendments Act of 1996 that guarantee federal nature of
funds and thereby avoid "Blaine-amendment-like" provisions of state constitutions and laws).
84. SeeA GUIDE TO CHAMrrABLE CHOICE, supranote 1,at25 (specifyingthatadministration of segregated federal block-grant funds must comply with principles of § 604a, but state
authorities can administer segregated state funds according to more restrictive state requirements).
85.
Cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (invalidating amendment to Colorado's Constitution because amendment violated Equal Protection Clause of federal Constitution); Kemerer, supra note 35, at 2 ("A ruling by a federal court that exclusion of sectarian
private schools from a state voucher program violates the Free Exercise Clause and/or the Equal
Protection Clause of the federal constitution would have the same effect [as the EAA did in
Garnett]." (citation omitted)).
86. See infra Part Ill (explaining Free Speech Clause's requirement of neutrality); infra
Part IV (setting out Establishment Clause's requirement of neutrality).
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D. Federal ConstitutionalPreemption
As explained above, the federal Constitution guarantees certain basic
rights upon which state constitutions may expand." However, the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation ofthe First Amendment creates a unique
situation that other amendments do not present: Because each of the three
clauses of the First Amendment requires neutrality toward religion,8 8 states are
left with less flexibility to define or to interpret state-provided religious liberties differently from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal guarantees.89 The complex interaction between state and federal religious freedoms
arises from the balance among the three clauses of the First Amendment9 ° and
from the balance that the Establishment Clause itself requires.9 For example,
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses ofthe First Amendment limit the
government's creation of burdens and benefits for religion.' The Establish87. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (explaining relationship between federal and state constitutions); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States:
The Revival ofState ConstitutionsasGuardiansofIndividualRights,N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 548
(1986) (reporting that between 1970 and 1984, state courts rendered over 250 opinions interpreting state constitutional requirements as more stringent but not contrary to federal constitutional standards).
88. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845 (1995)
(stating that each separate clause of First Amendment requires neutrality).
89. See Viteritti, supra note 40, at 148 ("Unlike other rights guaranteed by the Constitution, securing religious liberty is a matter of striking the proper balance between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses - a zero sum equation."); infra Part III (explaining that Free
Speech Clause might require government access or benefit that Establishment Clause does not
forbid); infra Part IV (explaining balance within Establishment Clause).
90. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,271,277 (1981) (considering exclusion
of religious student organization under both Establishment and Free Speech Clauses and finding
that first allowed access and second required access); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,66869 (1970) ("The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses,
both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme,
would tend to clash with the other."); Ralph D. Mawdsley, Commentary, Agostini v. Felton:
Is EstablishmentofReligioh Moving Toward a NondiscriminationModel?, 127 EDUC. L. REP.
(West) 13, 16 (1998) (referring to free speech rights as counterbalance to Establishment Clause).
The question of whether the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause conflict or
whether they actually complement each other when understood correctly is a subject of
considerable debate among scholars. See ARINM.ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMElRIc-, ANATION
DEDICATED TO REUiGIOUS LIBERTY 43,72 (1990) (criticizing dichotomy between Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses and asserting that clauses complement each other); Carl H. Esbeck,
Myths, Miscues, andMisconceptions: No-Aid Separationismand the EstablishmentClause,
13 NoTRE DAME J.L., ETimcs & PuB. POL'Y 285, 300-04 (1999) (asserting that Establishment
Clause neither conflicts with nor overrides Free Speech Clause or Free Exercise Clause).
91. See Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 846 (confirming "the very neutrality the Establishment
Clause requires"); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (stating that statute's "principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion" (emphasis added)
(citations omitted)); infra Part IV (describing Establishment Clause's principle of neutrality).
92. See ADAMS & EMMEIZICH, supra note 90, at 40-41 (stating that Supreme Court has
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ment Clause prohibits advancing or endorsing religion, and at the same time,
it forbids inhibiting or disfavoring religion.13 The Free Speech Clause curtails
the restrictions that the government can place on religious speech.94
Although the Supreme Court has had the opportunity to consider the constitutionality of a state Blaine provision, it specifically has declined to address
the issue. 5 For example, in Widmar v. Vincent, the Supreme Court recognized
that the state constitution required a stricter separation of church and state
than did the federal Constitution.96 However, the Missouri courts had not yet
decided whether allowing religious student groups to use university facilities
on an equal basis as nonreligious student groups violated the state constitution. 7 Therefore, the Supreme Court framed the issue not as a conflict
between the federal and state constitutions, but rather as a conflict between
the federal Constitution and the university's asserted interest in a greater
separation of church and state.98 The Widmar Court decided that the Free
Exercise Clause and the Free Speech Clause limited the university's interest;
but the Court limited its holding in the case, refusing to decide whether a
state's interest in complying with its own constitution could ever outweigh the
First Amendment's Free Speech Clause.99
Witters v. Washington DepartmentofServicesfor the Blind1" presented
a clearer example of a state constitution prohibiting benefits to a religious
group when the federal Constitution permitted funds indirectly to reach a
religious institution.1"1 When the United States Supreme Court initially heard
interpreted tension between Free Exercise and Establishment Clause so that attempts to exempt
religion from government burden often face challenge as government establishment of religion).
93. See infra Part IV (discussing neutrality requirement of Establishment Clause).
94. See infra Part II[ (explaining cases in which Supreme Court applied forum analysis
to exclusion of religious group or religious speech).
95. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (explaining issue of state constitutions in
Widmar and Witters); infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text (same).

96. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,275 (1981) (citing Americans United v. Rogers,
538 S.W.2d 711,720 (Mo. 1976), for proposition that state constitution required greater separation of church and state than did federal Constitution).
97. Id. at 275.
98. See id. at 275-76 (refusing to determine how Missouri courts would decide state
constitutional question and focusing instead on public university's asserted interest in greater
separation of church and state).
99. See id. (finding it unnecessary to decide whether Supremacy Clause would ever allow
state interest in own constitution to outweigh free speech interests).
100. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
101. See infra text accompanying notes 102-04 (describing Witters decisions). In the
Supreme Court's first consideration of Witters, the Court addressed whether the First Amendment prohibited a state from awarding a vocational grant to a visually handicapped student who
attended a Christian college where he studied to become a pastor, missionary, or youth director.
Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 482-83 (1986). Applying
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the case, the Court found that, when an educational grant was otherwise
available to blind students, providing a grant to a blind student who was pursuing a religious degree did not violate the Establishment Clause."° On
remand, the Washington Supreme Court found that the program violated the
state constitution's religion clause even though the program complied with the
federal Establishment Clause. 3 By refusing to grant certiorari on the second
appeal, the Supreme Court failed to take advantage of the opportunity to
consider the potential conflict between the state constitutional provision and
the First Amendment."T However, Widmar and Witters laid a foundation for
considering the conflict between the state and federal constitutions." 5 The
the first prong of the Lemon test, the United States Supreme Court found an "unmistakably
secular purpose" in the vocational grant program. Id. at 485-86. In considering the second
prong, the Court concluded that the grant was not an impermissible "direct subsidy" of religion
because the vocational assistance went directly to the student; flowed to the religious institution
as a result of private, independent choice; and created no financial incentive to attend a religious
school. Id. at 487-89. Because of the neutral availability of the grants, the recipient's choice
to use it for a religious education communicated no state endorsement of religion. Id. at 489.
Without considering the entanglement prong of the Lemon test or petitioner's free exercise
claim, the Supreme Court unanimously concluded that giving a vocational rehabilitation grant
to the petitioner did not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 489 & n.5. In closing, the
Court remarked: "On remand, the state court is of course free to consider the applicability of
the 'far stricter' dictates of the Washington State Constitution." Id.
102. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 489 (finding no prohibited state support of religion).
103. See Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1119-20 (Wash. 1989)
(holding that Commission did not err in denying funds to visually handicapped student to obtain
religious education because Washington Constitution prohibited that financial assistance). On
remand, the Washington Supreme Court considered whether allowing the grant violated the
Washington Constitution, and if so, whether denying the grant violated the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
1121. The state court decided that petitioner's request fell "precisely within the clear language
of the state constitutional prohibition against applying public moneys to any religious instruction," distinguishing the state constitution from the federal as forbidding both the appropriation
and the application of funds. Id. at 1121-22. According to the state court the denial of the
grant did not violate the applicant's free exercise rights because it neither compelled nor
pressured him to act in violation of his beliefs. Id. at 1122-23. Additionally, because of the
state's compelling interest in securing the strict separation of church and state that the state
constitution required, the Commission did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 1123.
104. See Vitters -,. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 493 U.S. 850, 850 (1989)
(denying petition for certiorari). Justice White dissented, stating that Witters presented important
Supremacy Clause questions because if the Establishment Clause permitted the individual's
private religious choice, the Free Exercise Clause might require it. See MeMonagle v. Northeast
Women's Ctr., Inc., 493 U.S. 901, 903-04 (1989) (White, J., dissenting) (expressing dissent
regarding denial of certiorari in several cases, including Witters).
105.
Cf David H. McClamrock, Note, The First Amendment and Public Funding of
Religiously ControlledorAffiliated HigherEducation, 17 J.C. & U.L. 381,408 (1991) ("The
Witters litigation.., provides a valuable focal point for examining possible conflicts between
the [F]irst [A]mendment and state restrictions on educational funding.").
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Supreme Court's decisions since Witters have developed the understanding of
of the state
the First Amendment in such a way that10 the
6 constitutionality
Blaine provisions is ripe for consideration.

HI The Free Speech Clause'sRequirement of Viewpoint and
ContentNeutrality
In several cases, the Supreme Court has applied both the Establishment
Clause and the Free Speech Clause to evaluate the government's treatment of
a religious group."° In each of these cases, the inclusion of a religious group
in a government-provided location or program invoked the Establishment
Clause," 8 and the group's religious expression in that forum implicated the
Free Speech Clause."° In these dual analysis cases, the Court determined that
106. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997) (stating that although
Establishment Clause principles have not changed, Supreme Court's understanding of criteria
has changed, and recent cases have undermined assumptions of former cases); Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995) (implying equivalency of Free
Speech and Establishment Clauses' requirements of neutrality); Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390-94 (1993) (applying free speech requirements to determine that school must allow religious group access); Hugh Baxter, Managing
Legal Change: The Transformation ofEstablishmentClauseLaw, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 343,
350-57 (1998) (reporting recent clarification of Establishment Clause doctrine); infra notes 13637 and accompanying text (discussing Rosenberger'sapplication of forum doctrine to metaphysical forum of funding); infra note 200 (mentioning recent focus on neutrality in Establishment Clause cases).
107. See generallyRosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(finding that Free Speech Clause requires disbursement of Student Activities Funds to thirdparty contractor on behalf of student publication regardless of religious viewpoint and also that
disbursement does not violate Establishment Clause); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd.
v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (applying precedents of Lamb's Chapel and Widmar to determine that private religious expression in public forum does not violate Establishment Clause);
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (concluding that
denying church access to school facilities to show film on family issues constitutes viewpoint
discrimination under Free Speech Clause and that allowing access does not violate Establishment Clause); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (determining that allowing religious
student organization access to facilities does not violate Establishment Clause but that denying
access violated Free Speech Clause).
108. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 83746 (evaluating disbursements from Student Activities Fund on behalf of student newspaper with religious viewpoint under Establishment Clause
analysis); Pinette, 515 U.S. at 759-60 (addressing unattended cross located in plaza by state
capitol building as implicating Establishment Clause); Lamb's Chapel,508 U.S. at 386,394-96
(considering church's use of school facilities to show film series under Establishment Clause
analysis); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265, 270-75 (examining use of university buildings by religious
student group and analyzing under Establishment Clause).
109. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-37 (conducting free speech analysis); Pinette, 515
U.S. at 760-63 (explaining forum analysis); Lamb's Chapel,508 U.S. at 390-94 (applying free
speech principles); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-70,277 (setting forth free speech requirements).
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the Establishment Clause permittedthe inclusion of the religious groups in a
government program or forum."' Furthermore, the Court asserted that the
Free Speech Clause requiredthat the religious groups have equal access to
government funds or facilities.1 1'
Under the First Amendment, religious speech receives the same constitutional protection as other forms of speech." 2 As explained further below, the
The distinction between individual and government speech is crucial. See Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) ("[A] State normally can be held responsible for a private
decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State.");
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-41 (1982) (asserting that financial dependence on
government does not change acts of private individuals into acts of state); see also Rosenberger,
515 U.S. at 841 (recognizing difference between government and private speech); Pinette, 515
U.S. at 763-66 (plurality) (same). This distinction between individual and government actors
determines the standard that the Court applies. First, government speech endorsing religion
violates the Establishment Clause, and individual speech endorsing religion does not. See
Board of Educ. of the Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,250 (1990) (highlighting "crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses protect"). Second, when the government itself is the speaker, it is exempt from
the Free Speech Clause's requirement that the government not discriminate against the content
or the viewpoint of speech. Cf infra note 147 (summarizing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173
(1991)).
110. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845 (finding no Establishment Clause violation by
including student publications with religious viewpoint in funding program); Pinette,515 U.S.
at 770 (plurality) (concluding that allowing private religious speech equal access to public
forum conformed with Establishment Clause standard); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395
(labeling fears of Establishment Clause violation "unfounded"); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271
(stating that "equal access" policy is not incompatible with Establishment Clause).
111. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 837 (concluding that regulation facially and effectively
denied right of free speech); Pinette, 515 U.S. at 763 (finding precedent ofLamb's Chapel and
Widmar determinative); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394 (finding denial of access to be in
violation of viewpoint neutrality); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277 (concluding that action violated
requirement of content neutrality); see also Viteritti, supra note 40, at 138 ("This Court strives
to assure that religious affiliation will not serve to deny entitlements to some that are made
available to all as a matter of general public policy. This approach [is most apparent] ... in
conjunction with those First Amendment freedoms that do not exclusively apply to religion.").
112. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 760 (contending that private religious speech receives same
protection as private secular speech (citing Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Board of
Edue. of the Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981))); McDaniel v. Paty, 435
U.S. 618,641 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring injudgment) ("Religionists no less than members
of any other group enjoy the full measure of protection afforded speech, association, and
political activity generally."); Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273, 1278
(10th Cir. 1996) ("The Supreme Court ... has rejected the notion that speech about religion,
religious speech designed to win converts, and religious worship... should be treated differently [than other forms of protected speech] under the First Amendment." (citing Lamb's
Chapel,508 U.S. at 394-96; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 n.6)).
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Court applied a free speech analysis because once the government creates a
forum, any limitation of expression within that forum must comply with constitutional standards."' In these cases, the Court looked for content discrimination, a denial of access because of the religious subject matter of the
group's expression." 4 In every instance in which the Court detected content
discrimination, it found the reasons for the discrimination insufficient to
The Court also looked for viewpoint discriminajustify the discrimination.'
tion, an exclusion of the religious group because of its religious standpoint." 6
When the Court found viewpoint discrimination, it presumed that the discrimiTherefore, in each case, the Court applied the
nation was unconstitutional.'
Free Speech Clause to require the government to allow the religious group
access to the government benefit on an equal basis with other participants." 8
Under these principles, a state's exclusion of religious organizations from
state social service voucher programs appears to require this dual analysis,
asking both if the Establishment Clause permits the inclusion of these groups
and if the Free Speech Clause forbids their exclusion." 9 As the Supreme
Court's precedents indicate and as Congress observed when enacting Charitable Choice, making religious organizations equally eligible to receive social
In a social
service vouchers does not violate the Establishment Clause.'
113. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(asserting that when forum is open, government must comply with Constitution); see also
infra Part II.A (describing forum analysis).
114. See infra Part III.C (considering content discrimination); infra note 157 and accompanying text (defining content as substance or subject matter of presentation).
115. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761-63 (1995)
(striking down state action that excluded speech precisely because of content); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (finding university unable to satisfy constitutional standard
for content-based exclusion).
116. See infra Part ll.B (explaining analysis of viewpoint discrimination); infra note 158
and accompanying text (defining viewpoint as motivating ideology, opinion, or perspective).
117. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(stating that Court presumes viewpoint discrimination unconstitutional when otherwise within
forum's limits); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394
(1993) (stating that government violates First Amendment when it excludes speech solely to
suppress viewpoint).
118. See supra note 111 (summarizing outcomes of cases requiring equal access for religious groups to government facilities or funds).
119. See infra text accompanying notes 120-25 (comparing exclusion of religious providers
from social service voucher programs with exclusion of religious groups from other government
benefits).
120. See H.R. CoNF.REP. No. 104-430,at361 (1995) (contending that Supreme Court has
found no Establishment Clause violation in permitting individual to redeem government-provided voucher with religious entity, despite indirect benefit to religion, provided that individual
has genuine choice (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters
v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
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service voucher program, the benefit flows primarily to the beneficiaries, not
the providers, and any benefit a religious provider receives is a result only ofthe
independent choices ofbeneficiaries 1 ' As the Supreme Court itself observed,
the Court has "consistently held that government programs that neutrally
provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge just because
22
sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated financial benefit.'
Free speech standards also apply to social service vouchers: Although
not all the programs to which vouchers apply serve informational purposes,
many of them do educate, train, and counsel." Drug-treatment programs,
legal aid centers, and abstinence education inherently involve speech, and
other social services, such as AIDS hospices, job-skills training, and maternity
homes may involve a substantial speech component. 24 Because the reason for
the exclusion is the providers' and the recipients' religious viewpoint, the
exclusion implicates the Free Speech Clause." The remainder of Part HI of
388 (1983))); see also Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 8 (asserting that Court has never stated that First
Amendment disables religious institutions from involvement in publicly sponsored social
welfare programs); Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unit of Separation and Neuftrality, 46
EMORY L.J. 43, 44, 67 (1997) (stating that Supreme Court has not limited government funding
of church-affiliated social services aside from in education and that ultimate constitutionality
of Charitable Choice depends on its implementation); cf.Eugene Volokh, Vouched For, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, July 6, 1998, at 12 (stating that only constitutional gray area regarding school
vouchers is not whether neutralitypermits inclusion of parochial schools but whether it requires
their inclusion).
121.
Cf supra note 11 (citing language of Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993);
Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,487-89 (1986); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388,399 (1983)).
122. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993) (citing Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
(1983)).
123. See supra note 77 (listing various programs to which Charitable Choice applies).
124. See supra note 77 (giving examples of services that Charitable Choice covers); see
also MONSMA, supra note 6, at 13 (asserting that many organizations take holistic approach,
including spiritual dimension, to problems such as spouse abuse, homelessness, poverty, abuse
and neglect of children, and drug abuse).
125. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,670 (1970) ("[C]hurches as much as secular
bodies and private citizens have that right [to take strong positions on public issues]."); Esbeck,
supra note 7, at 4 n.9 (stating that rights of religious organization are similar to individual rights
as long as organization can demonstrate injury-in-fact to its purposes or activities); Michael W.
McConnell,EqualTreahnentandReligiousDiscrimination,inEQUALTREATMENTOFRELIGION
INA PLURALTIC SOCIETY 30, 32 (Stephen V. Monsma & J. Christopher Soper eds., 1998)
("Religious citizens should not be required to engage in self-censorship as a precondition to participation in public programs. Public programs [are] open to all [controversial secular ideas and
viewpoints that] satisfy the objective purposes of the program.... [This] should be the rule for
religious ideas and viewpoints as well.").
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this Note considers whether excluding religious organizations from eligibility

in a state program solely on the basis of religion violates the Free Speech
Clause.
A. Fundingas a Forum
In the free speech portion ofthe dual analysis cases, the Court has applied
the public forum analysis.126 Under the forum analysis, if the government
through its policy or practice intentionally has opened a forum for public
assembly and speech or for the use of specific speakers or the discussion of
particular subjects,12 7 the federal Constitution forbids certain exclusions.128
Anytime, place, and manner regulations must be content-neutral, must be narrowly tailored to a significant government interest, and must leave open ample

alternative means of communication. 29 All content-based exclusions must be

narrowly tailored to the achievement of a compelling government interest. 3
Furthermore, the Court presumes that any viewpoint-based exclusion is
126. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-30 (setting out standard for limited public forum);
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995) (finding courthouse square to be traditional public forum); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392-93 (1993) (declining to label type of forum but citing standard
of Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) and
Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983));
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-70 (1981) (summarizing standard for "a forum generally
open for use by student groups").
127. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Edue. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985) (defining designated public forum). The Cornelius Court stated that it would not infer
that the government intended to create a forum if the nature of the property was inconsistent
with the expressive activity. Id. at 803. In the case of social service providers, the expressive
activity of religious providers is not incompatible with the purpose of the forum; in fact, in
certain instances, such as drug rehabilitation or legal aid centers, speech activities even may be
the purpose of the forum.
128. See Perry Edue. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(stating that although state had no obligation to create forum, Constitution forbids certain exclusions once forum is open to public).
129. See id. at 45 (explaining that time, place, and manner regulations must be "contentneutral, ... narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample
alternative channels of communication").
130. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995)
(considering content discrimination permissible if it preserves purpose of limited forum);
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995) (asserting that if
property has status of public forum, state may regulate expressive content only if restriction is
necessary to serve compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn); PerryEduc.Ass'n, 460 U.S.
at 45 (stating that any content-based exclusion from forum must be "necessary to serve a
compelling state interest" and "narrowly drawn to achieve that end"); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981) (stating that standard of review for discrimination on basis of religious
content in public forum requires that regulation be necessary to serve compelling state interest
and narrowly drawn to achieve that end).
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The Court's goal in applying the forum analysis is to pro-

vide all with equal access to a government-created forum.'32
Although a forum analysis often focuses on a physical location, 13 3 the
Court has applied the forum analysis to nonspatial forums as well. 3 4 For
135
example, in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia,
the Supreme Court refused to recognize a distinction between funding and
access to a physical location.1 36 The Rosenberger Court equated the funds
131. See Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 829-30 (considering viewpoint discrimination impermissible if it bans speech otherwise within limited forum's boundaries); Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993) (stating that discrimination against
religious viewpoint fails constitutional test unless Establishment Clause provides defense).
132. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271 (expressing "equal access" policy).
133. See generally,e.g., Ward v. RockAgainst Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (considering
New York City Central Park); Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (evaluating teacher
mailboxes); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640
(1981) (examining fairgrounds); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (addressing sidewalk around public school).
134. See generally, e.g., Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666
(1998) (concerning local political debate on state-funded television station); Rosenberger,515
U.S. 819 (1995) (evaluating Student Activities Fund); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (addressing charity drive aimed at federal employees).
Although the Court found no violation in denying access to the charity drive in Cornelius,
the importance of the case lies in that the Court "defined as the relevant forum an instrumentality of communication that had no physical existence." Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public
Forum -From Sidewalks to Cyberspace,58 OHIo ST. L.J. 1535, 1566 (1998).
135.
515 U.S. 819 (1995).
136. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 832 (1995)
(rejecting university's argument that scarcity distinguished provision of funds from access to
facilities). The question before the RosenbergerCourt involved how the principles of the Free
Speech and Establishment Clauses applied to the University.of Virginia's denial of funds to a
student group publishing a newspaper with a religious perspective. Id. at 823. The university
made disbursements from the Student Activities Fund (SAF) to third-party creditors of many
student organizations, but the University Guidelines prohibited SAF support for religious activities. Id. at 824-25. In considering the free speech claim, the Rosenberger Court first distinguished content discrimination and its subset viewpoint discrimination: It declared that the
Court may allow content discrimination ifit preserves the purpose of a limited public forum but
that it presumes viewpoint discrimination is unconstitutional if the speech is within the limited
forum. Id. at 829-30. The Court considered the fund to be a forum and found the denial of
funds was viewpoint-based. Id. at 830-31. Therefore, the denial violated the organization's free
speech rights. Id. at 837. The Court then addressed whether compliance with the Establishment
Clause required the violation of free speech. Id. First, the Court emphasized that a significant
factor in passing Establishment Clause scrutiny is the neutrality of the program toward religion.
Id. at 839. The purpose of the activities fund, to open a forum for speech and to support student
enterprises, was neutral toward religion. Id. at 840. Second, the Court emphasized the critical
difference between private and governmental speech, observing no real likelihood of governmental endorsement nor coercion because the group received only an incidental benefit on a
religion-neutral basis. Id. at 841-44. Therefore, the Establishment Clause did not require the
denial of funds. Id. at 843. In closing, the Court declared that denying free speech risks
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made available for student activities with a metaphysical forum.137 As a
result, under Rosenberger,even when the question is13access
to funding rather
8
than access to a situs, equal access principles apply.
Lower courts have required government programs to include religious
providers when they involve other nongovernmental providers.139 These lower
courts have extended Rosenbergerto other funding situations, and in the same
way, vouchers for social service providers resemble a metaphysical forum.14
As in Rosenberger, the purpose of the voucher program is not to support a
church but rather to increase and to improve the resources available to the
state for providing social services.14 Additionally, in a manner analogous to
hostility toward religion, possibly frustrating the neutrality that the Establishment Clause itself
demands. Id. at 845-46.
137. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 ("The SAF is a forum more in a metaphysical than
in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are applicable."). The majority in
Rosenberger appeared to find nothing radical in this extension of the public forum doctrine;
rather, they saw it as a natural outgrowth ofLamb's Chapeland Widnar. Gey, supra note 134,
at 1563-65.
138. See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (acknowledging that "the First Amendment certainly has application in the subsidy context"); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 ("Once it has opened a limited forum, however, the State ... may not
exclude speech where its distinction is not 'reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum,' nor may it discriminate against speech on the basis of its viewpoint." (citations omitted)); id. at 828 ("[T]he government offends the First Amendment when it imposes financial
burdens on certain speakers based on the content of their expression."); Viteritti, supra note 40,
at 140 (stating that government generally cannot deny religious citizens access to resources
otherwise available to everyone).
139. See Peter v. Wedl, 155 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that regulation granting
aid to special education student unless student attended religious school violated Free Exercise
Clause and Free Speech Clause); Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973, 986 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding
that under Free Exercise Clause, United States Army cannot exclude religious dayeare providers
from certification); see also Columbia Union College v. Clarke, 159 F.3d 151, 156, 169 (4th
Cir. 1998) (deciding that under Rosenberger, denying state-funded grant on basis of college's
religious perspective presumptively violated First Amendment but remanding case for inquiry
if college was pervasively sectarian), cert.denied, 119 S. Ct. 2357 (1999).
140. See Columbia Union College, 159 F.3d at 156 (asserting that Rosenbergercontrols
claim that denial of funding curtails free speech right); Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273, 1278, 1280-81 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that funds can be forum as in
Rosenberger and finding that prohibition of religious instruction and worship in senior center
supported in part by federal funds was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination); Gey, supra
note 134, at 1596-610 (arguing in support of considering government subsidies programs as
public forums). Gey defined a "metaphysical" public forum as an instrumentality of communication created to facilitate the dissemination of information or ideas. Id. at 1604. As mentioned
above, many social service providers serve informational and educational purposes. See supra
text accompanying notes 123-24.
141.
CompareEsbeck, supranote 7, at 36 (stating that one purpose of cooperation between
government and faith-based social service providers is to enhance quality or quantity of
services) with Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824 (asserting that basis for Student Activities Fund
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the student activities fund in Rosenberger, social service vouchers benefit the
individual recipients by supporting various social service programs.' 42
A key aspect of the forum analysis is that the state has no obligation to
open a forum to the public'43 or to keep a forum open indefinitely. 44 Also, the
state is under no obligation to subsidize the exercise of fundamental rights'4 5
or to involve independent providers in its government programs. 1 46 The Supreme Court has distinguished the following situations in which the government may selectively aid and regulate private speech: when the governmental
was recognition that range of opportunities enhanced environment of university). The Rosenberger Court specified that its decision did not reach an expenditure from a general tax fund
levied for the direct support of a church. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841 (distinguishing
expenditure from Student Activity Fund of public university from general tax fund levied for
direct support of church); see also id. at 853-55 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that intention
of Founders was that Establishment Clause forbid tax earmarked for religion). Some critics of
Charitable Choice argue that the Establishment Clause requires the exclusion of religious social
service providers from welfare programs that disburse moneys collected by general taxation.
See Esbeck, supra note 77, at 188-93 (responding to criticism of Charitable Choice). However,
in Flastv. Cohen, the Supreme Court rejected a federal taxpayer claim of religious coercion or
offense. Id. at 188 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)); see Everson v. Board of Edue.
of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947) (asserting that Establishment Clause does not forbid spending
tax funds to pay for busing of parochial students as part of general program that extends to
public and other schools). Taxpayers often support policies and programs with which they
disagree: pacifists pay for weapons of mass destruction, opponents of the death-penalty finance
execution of capital offenders, and taxpayers finance "the salaries of government officials whose
policies [they] despise." Esbeck, supra note 77, at 188.
142. Compare Esbeck, supra note 7, at 36 (stating that one purpose of cooperation is to
meet temporal needs of beneficiaries), and supra note 77 (providing examples of programs that
states can implement through vouchers), with Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 824 (1995) (explaining that Student Activities Fund "supported a broad range of
extracurricular activities .. .related to the educational purpose of the University" (internal
quotations omitted)).
143. See Cornelius v. NAACP Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985) (maintaining that not all protected speech is equally permissible on every type of government
property); Perry Edue. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,46 (1983) (observing that First Amendment creates no right of access to property simply because government
owns property (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114,129 (1981))).
144. See PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 (stating that although state has no obligation
to maintain open forum indefinitely, while forum is open, state is bound to constitutional obligations).
145. See Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 834 (acknowledging absence of requirement that government subsidize exercise of fundamental rights (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545-46 (1983))); see also infra note 148 (summarizing Regan).
146. See Laycock, supra note 120, at 61 (stating that discrimination between public and
private institutions is "rarely if ever" unconstitutional); cf id. (asserting that funding only public
schools discriminates between public and private schools and only incidentally between secular
and religious schools).
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actor employs private speakers to convey a government message,147 when the
refusal of a subsidy flows from a nonspeech classification, 4 ' and when the
governmental actor awards funds through a highly competitive and discretionary process. 4 9 However, aside from these instances in which the government

in essence has not opened a forum for speech, once the state creates a forum

147. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (stating that government can make content-based
choices only when it is speaker (distinguishing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)). But see
Gey, supranote 134, at 1598-603 (arguing that Rosenbergerand Rust are fundamentally inconsistent and concluding that Rust violates standard set in Rosenberger).
In Rust, the Court permitted a government prohibition on funding projects that engaged
in abortion counseling, referral, and activities. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 179-80, 203 (describing
Title X's conditions and finding no constitutional violation). The situation in Rust is distinguishable from social service vouchers for two reasons. First, the Rust Court recognized that
the government may make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion. Id. at 192 (citing
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)). Insharp contrast, the government may not favor or
disfavor religion. See infra notes 232-41 and accompanying text (stating that government may
not endorse or disfavor religion). Second, the Rust Court reasoned that the regulations ensured
that participants observed the limits of the federal program and that the program necessarily
discouraged alternative goals in order to advance its own. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193-94. In contrast, social service vouchers serve the purpose of improving welfare services, and the exclusion
of religious providers is not essential to that end. See Gey, supra note 134, at 1604 ("[T]he
government would be prohibited from imposing any restrictions on the private expressive use
of public subsidies unless such expression would significantly and directly interfere with the
legitimate nonexpressive operations of the government"). Although the government "is entitled
to define the limits of [its] program," Rust, 500 U.S. at 194, the limits themselves must conform
with constitutional standards.
148. See McClamrock, supranote 105, at 417 (distinguishing denying government subsidy
of speech itself for nonspeech reason from denying another benefit on basis of speech (comparing Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) with FCC v. League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984))). InRegan, the Court permitted a distinction between
veterans' organizations and other lobbying groups, but it cautioned that "[t]he case would be
different if Congress were to discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such away as to 'ai[m]
at the suppression of dangerous ideas."' Regan, 461 U.S. at 545-56 (internal quotations and
citations omitted). The RosenbergerCourt distinguished Regan because in Regan, the government classified speakers by veteran status, not by the content or the message of their speech, but
the university's regulation had as its "sole rationale and operative principle" a speech-based
restriction. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995). Inthe
same way, the exclusion of religious providers from state social service programs serves to
suppress viewpoint.
149. See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586 (1998) (recognizing exception for highly competitive and discretionary grant funding). Like the subsidies in
Rosenberger and in Columbia Union College, social service vouchers are "made available
generally" through a noncompetitive process. Columbia Union College v. Clarke, 159 F.3d
151, 171 (4th Cir. 1998) (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 2357 (1999).
Unlike NEA financing, creating a voucher program in which religious social service providers
may participate "is not a situation where there are a variety of different programs each seeking
to achieve a desired result and the government has elected to subsidize some programs and not
others." Esbeck, supra note 77, at 181.

EXCLUSION OFRELIGIOUS PROVIDERS

1321

either through funding or through a situs, it cannot discriminate against individuals within the forum on the basis of their viewpoints,5 ° and the state can
discriminate on the basis of content only ifithas sufficient justification.15'
Just as the states have no obligation to create a forum, the states have no
obligation to use the private sector in the provision of welfare services.' 52

Moreover, just as the government may set reasonable, content-neutral time,
place, and manner restrictions on speech within a public forum, the government also may create content-neutral eligibility criteria for social service providers.'5 3 Therefore, religious providers of social services would be subject
to the same eligibility criteria as other nongovernmental providers. 4 Yet
once a state creates a forum by funding vouchers for independent providers
of social services, under free speech standards, a state's exclusion of religious
providers is subject5 to constitutional standards regarding viewpoint and content discrimination.1
150. See Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 829, 835 (asserting that targeting speech on basis of
speaker's views is blatant violation of First Amendment); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (declaring that regulation cannot be "an effort to
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view").
151. See Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 829-30 (explaining that once state has opened limited
public forum, it may discriminate by content only to preserve purpose of limited forum);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-70 (1981) (finding that once university created forum
for student groups, any content-based restriction required justification by compelling state
interest and means narrowly drawn to achieve that end); infra note 182 (explaining debate
concerning standard for content discrimination).
152. See Esbeck, supra note 7, at 8 (confirming absence of right to equal treatment
between governmental and independent-sector providers); Laycock, supranote 120, at 61 ("Discrimination between public and private institutions is rarely, if ever, unconstitutional ....).
153. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
(allowing reasonable restrictions on time, place, and manner of protected speech, provided that
restrictions "are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are
narrowly tailored to serve a siguificant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information" (citations omitted)).
154. SeeA GUIDE TO CHAPTABLE CHOICE, supranote 1, at 5 (asserting that although state
cannot rule out any group on basis of its religious character, it may set criteria for participation
in program); Esbeck, supranote 77, at 191 ("The criteria [are] secular. There [are] no other criteria. Charitable Choice does not guarantee that some or all religious providers will be [allowed
to participate in voucher programs]. Rather, it guarantees that they will not be discriminated
against on account of religion.").
155. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995)
(stating that once university offered to pay third-party contractors on behalf of private speakers,
it could not silence selected viewpoints); Columbia Union College v. Clarke, 159 F.3d 151, 156
(4th Cir. 1998) (pointing out that prohibition of viewpoint discrimination applies whether
government subsidizes or penalizes private speech (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,394 (1993))), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2357 (1999); Gay
& Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 362 (8th Cir. 1988) ("The University need
not supply funds to student organizations; but once having decided to do so, it is bound by the
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B. Religion as a Viewpoint

The Supreme Court has distinguished viewpoint and content discrimination, labeling viewpoint discrimination as a subset of content discrimination. 56 In certain situations the Court permits content discrimination,that is,
excluding the substantive content or the subject matter of the speech. 57 In
contrast, the Court presumes that viewpoint discriminationis unconstitutional
because discrimination based upon motivating ideology, opinion, or perspective is impermissible when otherwise within the forum's limits. 5
Although religion arguably always constitutes a viewpoint, ideology, or
perspective, 59 courts have debated whether religion constitutes the particular
viewpoint of the speaker or if it describes the content of the speech. 6 For
First Amendment to act without regard to the content of the ideas being expressed."); Esbeck,
supra note 7, at 9 (explaining that although providing assistance through only governmentoperated agencies does not violate Constitution, if state chooses to involve independent sector,
it cannot specifically disqualify religious providers); infra Part II.B-C (discussing viewpoint
and content discrimination).
156. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(labeling viewpoint discrimination "an egregious form of content discrimination"); RAY.V.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (finding that ordinance went beyond content
discrimination to viewpoint discrimination).
157. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828 (equating content discrimination with discriminating by subject matter); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46
(1983) (stating that in traditional or designated public forum, content-based regulation must be
necessary to serve compelling interest and narrowly drawn to achieve that end, but in nonpublic
forum such limitations need only be reasonable in light of forum's purpose); infra Part Il.C
(discussing content discrimination).
158. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-30 (defining viewpoint and creating presumption
that viewpoint discrimination is impermissible when speech is otherwise within limitations of
forum); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,392-96 (1993)
(asserting that First Amendment prohibits government from favoring one viewpoint over
another and from discriminating against religious standpoint or perspective); Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (contending that denying
access to speaker simply in order to suppress speaker's point of view on otherwise includible
subject violates First Amendment).
159. See Church on the Rock v. City ofAlbuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273, 1279 (10th Cir. 1996)
("Any prohibition of sectarian instruction where other instruction is permitted is inherently nonneutral with respect to viewpoint... Because there is no nonreligious sectarian instruction
(and indeed the concept is a contradiction in terms), a restriction prohibiting sectarian instruction intrinsically favors secularism at the expense of religion."); Brief for Pet'rs at 41,
Rosenberger(No. 94-329) ("[T]he belief that 'religion' is a separate and distinct subject matter
rather than a 'perspective' . . . on any number of issues.., evinces a serious misunderstanding
of the nature of religion... [which] competes in the marketplace of ideas with scores of secular
philosophies, ideologies, and worldviews ...."); Dhananjai Shivakumar, Neutrality and the
Religion Clauses, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.505, 521 (1998) ("Assuming that a religious
perspective can be given on almost any subject matter, it is virtually impossible for a state to
create secular, limited public fora.").
160. See, e.g.,Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 831 (finding viewpoint of speaker to be religious);
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example, inLamb's Chapelv. CenterMorichesUnionFree SchoolDistrict,6
a school district refused a church's request to show a film series in school
facilities. 62 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found
that the film's content was religion, whereas the United States Supreme Court
determined that the content of the film consisted of fhmily issues presented
from a religious viewpoint. 63 The Court has stated that the distinction between viewpoint and content is imprecise," and it has provided little explana-

tion for this differentiation. 65 In Lamb's Chapel, for instance, the Court

simply asserted that the standard that the school district applied discriminated
on the basis of viewpoint because it granted access to presentations of any
view on the family except a religious view.' 66
Despite the imprecision inherent in drawing lines between viewpoint and
content discrimination, the characterization of religion as viewpoint or as conLamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394 (same); Travis v. Owego-Apalachin Sch. Dist., 927 F.2d 688,
693-94 (2d Cir. 1991) (same). But see, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette,
515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995) (characterizing content of expression to be religion); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981) (same); Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d
1366, 1370 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); Concerned Women for Am., Inc. v. Lafayette County, 883
F.2d 32, 34 (5th Cir. 1989) (same).
161.
508 U.S. 384 (1993).
162. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 388
(1993) (stating that school district denied church access to show film series featuring Dr. James
Dobson). The Court in Lamb's Chapeladdressed the issue of whether denying a church access
to school grounds to present a film series violated the Free Speech Clause. Id. at 387. Although
the parties had debated which standard to apply to content restrictions in the public forum in
the lower court, the Supreme Court declined to address this question. Id. at 391-92. The Court
decided that even if the property was not a designated public forum, restrictions within the
forum must be viewpoint neutral. Id. at 392-93. Therefore, denying access only on the grounds
of the film's religious standpoint violated the First Amendment's prohibition of the government's favoring some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others. Id. at 394. Additionally,
the Lamb's Chapel Court asserted that the school district's alleged fears of violating the Establishment Clause by allowing a showing of the film were unfounded. Id. at 395.
163. See id. at 393-94 (disagreeing with court of appeals's finding that denial was viewpoint neutral because sole basis for denial was religious standpoint). The Supreme Court
explained that the lower court had found the exclusion viewpoint neutral because all religions
received like treatment. Id. at 393. However, excluding all presentations with a religious
standpoint was not viewpoint neutral when all other views on family issues had access to the
forum. Id.
164. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995)
(asserting that distinction between content and viewpoint is not precise).
165.
See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394, 396 (asserting, without explanation, disagreement with lower court's characterization, and labeling speech viewpoint without defining term).
166. See id. at 393 (finding that standard applied by school district "discriminates on the
basis of viewpoint [because it] permit[s] school property to be used for the presentation of all
views about family issues and child rearing except those dealing with the subject matter from
a religious standpoint").
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tent can determine the outcome of a case. 67 As mentioned above, the United
States Court of Appeals forthe Second Circuit in Lamb's Chapel decided that
the denial of access to the religious group was simply content discrimination,
not viewpoint discrimination.' 68 The appellate court therefore applied a
reasonableness test to the church's exclusion from the forum, a test that the
school's decision passed.'69 In contrast, once the Supreme Court determined
that the exclusion hinged on the religious viewpoint of the material, it found
the exclusion unconstitutional because the government may not favor one
viewpoint at the expense of another.' The Supreme Court therefore reversed
the appellate court's decision because to exclude a group that qualified for
funding or access "save for its religious purpose" violated the free speech
guarantee of viewpoint neutrality.171
As applied to social service vouchers, Blaine provisions discriminate on
the basis of viewpoint in that they allow the redemption of vouchers with all
eligible service providers except those who offer a religious perspective.'72
The choice to redeem a social service voucher with a religious provider involves the individual viewpoint - the specific motivating ideology, opinion, or
167. See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text (describing how characterization as
viewpoint discrimination proved outcome determinative in Lamb's Chapel).
168. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist, 959 F.2d 381, 386-87
(2d Cir. 1992) (finding exclusion of group with religious purpose acceptable in limited public
forum in which exclusions based on subject matter are permissible but exclusions by viewpoint
are not), rev'd, 508 U.S. 384 (1993); see also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist, 508 U.S. 384, 386 (1993) (stating that attorney general defended exclusion as
permissible exclusion of subject matter and that court of appeals apparently agreed).
169. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 390, 393 n.6 (pointing out that although court of
appeals "apparently" found exclusion reasonable, lower court "uttered not a word in support of
its reasonableness holding").
170. See id.at 394 (stating that First Amendment forbids government to regulate speech
so as to favor some ideas or viewpoints and thereby to disadvantage others); City Council v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) ("[T]he First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others.").
171.
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 832 (1995)
(explaining that in Lamb's Chapel,discrimination was invalid because group would have qualified "save for its religious purposes"); Lamb's Chapel,508 U.S. at 393-94 (finding no indication in record that school district denied or would have denied access for any reason other than
religious perspective).
172. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 832 (comparing denial of funds in Rosenberger to
denial of access in Lamb's Chapelbecause in both instances only justification given was religious views of group). Compare supranotes 34-35 (summarizing state Blaine provisions), and
supra text accompanying note 38 (quoting original proposed federal constitutional amendment),
with Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 825 (quoting university guidelines that excluded religious activity, defined as any activity that "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about
a deity or an ultimate reality" (internal quotations omitted)), and Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at
387 (quoting school district's rule that provided that "[t]he school premises shall not be used
by any group for religious purposes").
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perspective 1 3 - ofboth the provider and the recipient.' 74 For the provider, the
religious viewpoint may be a primary motivation and an essential element of
the program.175 The recipient's agreement with the provider's viewpoint may
not be central to the recipient's decision, but the recipient must at least find1 76the
viewpoint inoffensive enough so as not to request an alternative provider.
A state that excludes religious providers from its social service program
and that permits individuals to redeem vouchers only with nonreligious
service providers creates a preference for secular or nonreligious viewpoints
at the expense of religious viewpoints.'" Additionally, when a state classifies
expression by its religious viewpoint, it creates a danger of chilling individual
thought and expression.'7 8 Therefore, excluding religious providers from
eligibility in state social service voucher programs constitutes impermissible
viewpoint discrimination.' 79
173. See Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 829 (equating viewpoint discriminationwith "regulating
speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the
rationale for the restriction").
174. See LORDEMAN, supra note 5, at 1 ("The most distinguishing characteristic of a
voucher is that it is a payment mechanism for services chosen by an individualrather than by
an agency."); see also Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973, 985 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that to
prohibit any religious practices in on-base daycare program was "extraordinary and unprecedented" application of governmental authority to private acts of religion and that it failed standard set by religion clauses); infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text (explaining involvement of viewpoints in provision of services).
175. See MONSMA, supra note 6, at 13 ("Many organizations are convinced if ills of a
hurting society - spouse abuse, homelessness, poverty, abuse and neglect of children, drug
abuse, and more - are to be successfully dealt with, a holistic approach that includes the
spiritual dimension of human beings needs to be followed."); supra note 7 (asserting success
of providers with religious viewpoint); cf. Charles Murray, Preface to MARVIN OLASKY, THE
TRAGEDY OF AMEICAN COMPASSION at xi, xvii (1992) (asserting that social problems result
from needs of human spirit, not from economics or inequality).
176. Cf. PRWORA § 104(g), 42 U.S.C. § 604a(g) (Supp. IV 1997) (protecting beneficiary's free exercise of religion); A GUIDE TO CHARrABLE CHOICE, supra note 1, at 16 (explaining that beneficiary who objects to religious character of provider has statutory right to service
from another provider); supra note 74 (explaining Charitable Choice's protection of beneficiary's free exercise of religion).
177. See supra note 170 (citing Lamb's Chapel's prohibition of preferring one viewpoint
at expense of another); cf. infra Part V.B.2 (describing endorsement test and prohibition of
communicating message of disfavor toward religion).
178. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995)
("Vital First Amendment speech principles are at stake .... [G]ranting the State the power to
examine [speech for religious perspectives creates a] danger ... to speech from the chilling of
individual thought and expression."); cf id.at 844 ("[It] raises the specter ofgovemmental censorship[ ] to ensure that all student writings meet some baseline standard of secular orthodoxy.").
179. See Columbia Union College v. Clarke, 119 S. Ct. 2357, 2358 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("[O]ur decisions . . . have prohibited governments from discriminating in the
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C. Religion as Content

Even if a court departs fromLamb's Chapel and Rosenbergerby labeling
the religious aspect of the social services as content rather than as

viewpoint, 8 ' disqualifying an organization on that basis still fails the federal

constitutional test.'81 The government must have a compelling interest and
narrowly tailored means of achieving that interest in order to justify contentbased discrimination within a forum.'82 Government entities have alleged
various justifications for the exclusion of religious groups from a forum, but
the only justification the Court has recognized as compelling is compliance
with the Establishment Clause. 83 For example, the respondents in Widmarv.
distribution of public benefits based upon religious status or sincerity." (citing Rosenberger, 515
U.S. 819; Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981))).
180. See Bronx Household of Faith v. Community Sch. Dist. No. 10,127 F.3d 207,213-15
(2d Cir. 1997) (finding that exclusion of church seeking access for religious worship service in
limited public forum was limit on subject matter that was reasonable and viewpoint neutral,
despite Supreme Court's suggestion in Lamb's Chapel that such exclusion is not reasonable
(citingLahib's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393 n.6)), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 1517 (1998).
181. See infra notes 182-95 and accompanying text (discussing content discrimination).
182. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678
(1992) ("[A] designated public forum, whether of a limited or an unlimited character,. . . is
subject to the same limitations as that governing a traditional public forum." (citing Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983))); PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460
U.S. at 45-46 (stating that in traditional or designated public forum, content-based exclusion
must be necessary to serve compelling interest and narrowly drawn to achieve that end, but in
nonpublic forum such limitations need only be reasonable in light of forum's purpose); Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,270 (1981) (applying standard of review for content-based exclusions
in public forum: regulation must serve compelling state interest and be narrowly drawn to
achieve that end). But compare Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 ("Once [the state] has opened
a limited forum,. . . [t]he State may not exclude speech where its distinction is not 'reasonable
in light of the purpose served by the forum."') with DenverArea Educ. Telecomms. Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 750 (1996) (stating that Court had not determined whether "government's decision to dedicate a public forum to one type of content or another [thereby creating
a limited public forum] is necessarily subject to the highest level of scrutiny"). As the above
quotations demonstrate, the Court's public forum doctrine is "notoriously confused." Jessica
A. Roth, It Is Lawyers We Are Funding: A ConstitutionalChallenge to the 1996 Restrictions
on the Legal Services Corporation,33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 107, 131 (1998). However,
in Larson v. Valente, the Court applied the strict scrutiny standard in an Establishment Clause
case, providing an additional reason to analyze the question under the compelling interest
standard. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (applying strict scrutiny to denominational preference).
183. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271 (finding that although university had compelling interest
in complying with Establishment Clause, equal access policy is not incompatible with Establishment Clause); infra notes 184-90 and accompanying text (summarizing justifications that
government entities have cited). The Widmar Court did not consider the sufficiency of an
interest in complying with the state constitution because the state courts never had decided that

EXCLUSION OFRELIGIOUSPROVIDERS

1327

Vincent alleged that creating a degree of separation between church and state
even greater than the separation that the Establishment Clause required was
a compelling interest that justified content discrimination. 18 4 The Court disagreed and did not find this interest in greater separation compelling. 8
Another possible asserted justification for the exclusion of religious
groups is the state constitution itself.'8 6 The rules and regulations in Rosenberger,Lamb's Chapel, and Widmar contained prohibitions similar to those
in the state Blaine provisions, and the Court invalidated each regulation.'87
Nevertheless, a state might argue that the state constitution creates a more
compelling interest for content discrimination than did mere regulations. 8
However, if even a federal statute can preempt a state constitution under the
Supremacy Clause's hierarchy, 89 courts are likely to reject the argument that
simply complying with a state constitution creates a compelling interest in
discriminating against religion in violation ofthe federal Constitution. 9 '
allowing a religious student group access violated the Missouri Constitution. Widmar, 454 U.S.
at 275-76.
184. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276 (stating that respondents asserted state interest in securing greater separation of church and state than separation that Establishment Clause already
ensured).
185. See id. (finding that in constitutional context of case, state lacked sufficiently compelling interest to justify content-based discrimination against respondents' religious speech);
see also Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1134-35 (Wash. 1989)
(Dolliver, J., dissenting) ("The importance of Widmar to the case before this court is that the
Court did not find it a compelling reason that the State wanted greater separation of church and
state under its state constitution than was required by the federal establishment clause.").
186. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1981) (asserting interest in complying
with state constitution).
187. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 825 (1995)
(stating that university's guidelines prohibited funding of religious activities, and quoting
definition of religious activity as any activity that "primarily promotes or manifests a particular
belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality"); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 387 (1993) (quoting district rule that provided that "school
premises shall not be used by any group for religious purposes"); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265
(quoting university regulation that prohibited use of university buildings or grounds "for
purposes of religious worship or religious teaching").
188. Cf Widmar, 454 U.S. at 275-76 (stating that Court did not need to reach issue that
respondents raised of whether state interest in complying with state constitution could outweigh
Free Speech Clause). In Rosenberger and Lamb's Chapel,the Court considered the regulations
to be viewpoint discrimination and therefore did not look for content discrimination. See
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (finding viewpoint discrimination); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at
394 (same).
189. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing Supremacy Clause and
statutory preemption).
190. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text (comparing interest in complying with
regulation, with state constitution, and with federal statute); see also Church on the Rock v. City
of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273, 1280 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that compliance with federal
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As stated above, the Court has recognized compliance with the Establishment Clause as a compelling state interest.'"9 However, because the inclusion
of religious providers in social service voucher programs does not violate the
Establishment Clause,"2 states have no compelling interest to exclude them
from the state voucher programs.'93 The private religious expression of the
social service provider does not interfere with the program's purpose of
providing a social service, as long as the provider complies with other constitutional, content-neutral criteria.'94 The state simply cannot set the criteria
according to religious viewpoint or content.'9 5
IV The EstablishmentClause'sPrincipleofNeutrality
Aside from the fact that the state's exclusion of religious organizations
from state voucher programs violates the free speech principles set out in the
dual analysis cases, it also risks violating the neutrality requirement of the
Establishment Clause.' 96 The Supreme Court often has applied the Establishstatute did not justify discrimination against religious presentation because state's interest in
receiving federal funds was not compelling).
191. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (stating Court has found compelling
interest in compliance with Establishment Clause).
192. See supra notes 11, 120-22 and accompanying text (asserting that allowing religious
provider to participate in social service voucher program on same basis as other independent
providers does not violate Establishment Clause).
193. See Shivakumar, supra note 159, at 521 ("[D]isfavoring religion, unless mandated by
the Establishment Clause, could not justify content-based discrimination against religious
speech.").
194. See Gey, supranote 134, at 1566 ("[Plublic forum determinations should be governed
by assessments of whether private expression will interfere with legitimate government activities."); supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (citing Charitable Choice requirement that
program comply with Establishment Clause and also preserve free exercise rights of provider
and beneficiary).
195. See Columbia Union College v. Clarke, 159 F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding
that in comparison to Rosenberger, "[tihe Sellinger program similarly infringed on Columbia
Union's free speech rights by establishing a broad grant program to provide financial support
for private colleges that meet basic eligibility criteria but denying funding to Columbia Union
solely because of its alleged pervasively partisan religious viewpoint"), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
2357 (1999); Esbeck, supra note 77, at 191 (asserting that in religion-neutral welfare program,
faith-based providers will face same secular criteria as other providers).
196. See Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973, 978 (6th Cir. 1995) ("A rule that uniformly bans
all religious practice is not neutral... . [T]he Supreme Court has made it clear that 'neutral'
also means that there must be neutrality between religion and nonreligion."); see also Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992) ("A relentless and all-pervasive attempt to exclude religion
from every aspect of public life could itself become inconsistent with the Constitution.");
Columbia Union College, 159 F.3d at 172 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (observing that state's
attempt to avoid any promotion of religion actually violated "a different core principle of the
Establishment Clause, the requirement of nondiscrimination among religions" and that all
religious viewpoints should receive similar, neutral treatment).
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ment Clause either to permit 19 or to forbid19 the inclusion of a religious
group or religious speech, but never to requireit.' Despite this fact, throughout its decisions the Supreme Court consistently has recognized neutrality as
one of the core principles of the Establishment Clause and has emphasized
neutrality in its recent opinions. 2" For example, in Rosenberger, the Court
197. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (explaining that in each of dual analysis
cases, Establishment Clause permitted inclusion of religious group).
198. See generally, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffitee, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (determining that statute
authorizing period of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer" in public schools constituted
establishment of religion); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (concluding that exempting
only religious organizations that received over half their contributions from members was
denominational preference forbidden by Establishment Clause); School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (finding that requiring Bible reading or recitation
of Lord's Prayer in public school violated Establishment Clause).
199. See Esbeck, supra note 7, at 23 (stating that "unbroken line of victories for the equal
treatment of religion" from Widmar to Rosenberger arose under Free Speech Clause and that
question of equal right to participate in direct funding programs remains); id. at 34 (contending
that in absence of free speech claim it is unclear that Court would compel equal treatment of
religion as Court did in Rosenberger, Widmar, Lamb's Chapel, and Pinette); see also MawdsIcy, supra note 90, at 26 n.87 (contending that Establishment Clause simply determines whether
government may provide services to religious schools, not whether it must). But see infra note
201 (citing Rosenberger'ssuggestion of same result under Establishment Clause as under Free
Speech Clause); but see also Mawdsley, supra note 90, at 27-30 (suggesting that although Court
has determined that aid to student at parochial school does not violate Establishment Clause,
Court still must answer whether denial of aid reflects hostility toward religion).
For example, the Court found no Establishment Clause violation in granting access to a
religious student group in Widmar or in allowing a publication with a religious perspective to
benefit from the activities fund in Rosenberger. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819,845 (1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,270-75 (1981). However,
in determining what the federal Constitution required of the state, the Court turned to the Free
Speech Clause. Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 828-29; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277.
200. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 230-32 (1997) (focusing on neutral eligibility
criteria); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995) (stating
that series of eases established that "the guarantee of neutrality is respected, not offended, when
the government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse");
Columbia Union College, 159 F.3d at 171 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) ("There is no question
that the neutrality principle is on the rise." (citing Agostini, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Rosenberger,
515 U.S. 819 (1995); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Employment
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474
U.S. 481 (1986))); Brief for Pet'rs at 59, Rosenberger (No. 94-329) ("Although the most
emphatic opinions stressing the overriding importance of neutrality have been relatively recent,
the principle is not new." (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 697 (1970); Everson v.
Board of Edue. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947))); Shivakumar, supranote 159, at 505 (asserting that ideal of neutrality toward religion has long history in Supreme Court's interpretation
of religion clauses).
In some cases, the Court simply confirmed that the Establishment Clause does not forbid
neutrality toward religion. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,
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suggested that the Establishment Clause mandates neutrality in the same way
that the Free Speech Clause does.2 01 Although the Rosenberger Supreme
Court required that the student group receive funding under the Free Speech
Clause, the Court indicated that it might have reached the same conclusion
under the Establishment Clause. 2
A. Neutrality as a GeneralRequirement of the EstablishmentClause
The principle of neutrality unifies the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause decisions. 3 In Everson v. Board of Education, ° the Court for the
764-65 (1995) (plurality) (asserting that equal access does not favor religion and that neutrality
toward religion does not violate Establishment Clause). In others, the Court maintained that the
Establishment Clause not only permits neutrality, but also mandates neutrality toward religion.
See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 226 ("In the relationship between man and religion, the State is firmly
committed to a position of neutrality.... [T]he rule itself is clearly and concisely stated in the
words ofthe First Amendment."). InEpperson v. Arkansas,the Court declared:
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of
religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to
the advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or
religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite. The First
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and
between religion and nonreligion.
393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968). The neutrality theory received its clearest articulation in Widmar.
Esbeck, supra note 7, at 4. However, the Court in Widmar adopted no new rule and overruled
no precedent. See Laycock, supra note 120, at 62-63 (asserting that Widmar was easy case
rooted in earlier nondiscrimination case law such as Jehovah's Witness free speech cases and
Everson).
201. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845 (1993)
(contending that university's action risked violating neutrality of Establishment Clause). In its
conclusion in Rosenberger,the Supreme Court stated:
The neutrality commanded of the State by the separate Clauses of the First Amendment was compromised by the University's course of action.... That course of
action was a denial of the right of free speech and would risk fostering a pervasive
bias or hostility to religion, which could undermine the very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires.
Id. at 845-46; see Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,390
n.4 (1993) (clarifying that decision did not reach merits of petitioners' claim that denial of
access violated Establishment Clause by demonstrating hostility toward religion). This footnote
in Lamb's Chapel also suggests that in another context the Court may consider the claim that
a blanket exclusion of religion creates an impermissible hostility toward religion.
202. See supra note 201 (quoting Rosenberger and citing Lamb's Chapel); see also
Esbeck, supra note 7, at 33 (concluding that when Court considers direct aid, analysis of Pinette
and Rosenbergerdemonstrates that four Justices allow rule of neutrality, that four remain loyal
to theory of no-aid separationism, and that Justice O'Connor is swing vote); Volokh, supranote
120, at 12 ("The best way to read the Establishment Clause is that it requires neutrality with
respect to religion ....).

203. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839 ("A central lesson of our decisions is that a
significant factor in upholding governmental programs in the face of Establishment Clause
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first time decided a case solely under the Establishment Clause." 5 The Everson Court mentioned the importance of the separation of government and
religion,2" yet it emphasized the importance of neutrality toward religion and
found that the state action at issue did not violate the Establishment Clause. 7
Although the Court cautioned that the government cannot levy a tax for the
support of religion, it asserted that the First Amendment requires neutrality in
that the government may neither handicap nor favor religion. 08
attack is their neutrality towards religion."); see also Columbia Union College v. Clarke, 119
S. Ct 2357,2358 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Constitution requires, at a minimum,
neutrality not hostility toward religion."); Volokh, supranote 21, at 367 ("Under all its leading
Establishment Clause tests [with the exception of the coercion test], the Court has used the
language of evenhandedness."); supranote 200 (citing recent Supreme Court cases that emphasize importance of neutrality); infra notes 205, 207 (summarizing early cases that require neutrality toward religion).
204. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
205. See School Dist ofAbington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,246(1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (referring to Everson as first Supreme Court decision addressing unconstitutionality of government action purely under Establishment Clause). In Everson, the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of a plan that reimbursed parents for the cost of bus
transportation to schools. Everson v. Board of Edue. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 3 (1947). Some
of the funds paid for transportation of children to Catholic parochial schools. Id. The
Everson Court stated that the First Amendment, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, did not prohibit a general reimbursement program that applied to parents
regardless of their religion. Id. at 8, 17-18. The Everson Court reached this conclusion even
while recognizing that the program benefitted the children attending church schools and perhaps
even enabled some to attend parochial schools who otherwise could not Id. at 17.
206. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 ("No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion."); see also Esbeek, supra note 7, at 3 (stating that
Everson adopted no-aid separationist interpretation of Establishment Clause). But see Everson,
330 U.S. at 16 (cautioning that protecting citizens from state-established churches should not
lead to prohibition of benefitting from general state laws without regard to religious belief);
Laycock, supra note 120, at 53 (emphasizing that nondiscrimination language of Everson
follows no-aid language and thus rejects strong version of no-aid theory).
207. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (asserting that First Amendment "requires the state to be
a neutral [sic] in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers .... State
power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them"); id. (finding
that program did not even "slight[ly] breach" "high and impregnable" wall between church and
state); see also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 217, 222 (approving of strict separation yet also referring
to "wholesome neutrality" of religion clauses); Laycock, supra note 120, at 54, 74 (concluding
that no-aid theory and nondiscrimination theory always coexisted and continue to do so).
208. See supra note 206 (quoting separationist language of Everson); supra note 207
(quoting neutrality language ofEverson); cf supra note 141 and accompanying text (distinguishing social service voucher from tax levied for direct support of religion). The Everson Court also
stated: "[The state] cannot exclude individual... members of any... faith, because of their
faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation." Everson, 330 U.S.
at 16. The exclusion of religious social service providers from a state voucher program would
not prevent individual recipients from receiving the benefits because they could redeem the
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This principle of neutrality contains several elements. 0 9 Neutrality forbids hostility toward religion.21 Neutrality does not require the exclusion of

religion from public life; rather, neutrality requires the accommodation of
religion."' Moreover, because treating all religions alike by excluding them
from government benefits is not synonymous with neutrality,2 12 the govern-

ment may neither
discriminate between religion and nonreligion nor endorse
13
secularism.

vouchers -with nonreligious providers; however, it would exclude religious providers from the
benefits of the public welfare legislation unless they renounced their religious affiliation.
209. See infra notes 210-13 and accompanying text (setting out requirement that action
neither be hostile nor promote religion of secularism); infra Part IV.B.1 (explaining elements of
Lemon test); infra Part IV.B.2 (focusing on endorsement test); see also Volokh, supranote 21,
at 369 ("These statements have largely been dicta, but the Court has repeated them so often that
we must assume that it meant them. .. ."). For a more thorough definition of the principle of
neutrality, see Esbeek, supra note 7, at 20-39 (describing Court's paradigm of governmental
neutrality); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and DisaggregatedNeutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001 (1990) (defining substantive neutrality as requirement
of religion clauses that government "minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance").
210. See Board of Educ. of the Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,248
(1990) (plurality) ("Wf a State refused to let religious groups use facilities open to others, then
it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward religion."); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 673 (1984) ("[T]he Constitution... affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely
tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any. Anything less would require the
'callous indifference' we have said was never intended by the Establishment Clause." (citations
omitted)); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment)
("The Establishment Clause does not license government to treat religion and those who teach
or practice it, simply by virtue of their status as such, as subversive of American ideals and
therefore subject to unique disabilities."); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968)
(forbidding hostility toward religion).
211. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (asserting that Constitution requires not only toleration
of religion but also accommodation); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (stating
that policy of neutrality derives from accommodation of both Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses); School Dist. ofAbington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,306 (1963) (Goldberg,
J., concurring) ("[U]ntutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead to ... a brooding
and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious.
Such results are not only not compelled by the Constitution, but, it seems to me, are prohibited
byit.").
212. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist, 508 U.S. 384, 393
(1993) (emphasizing that treating all religions and all uses for religious purposes alike is not
synonymous with viewpoint neutrality).
213. See, e.g., Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103-04 (asserting that First Amendment mandates
neutrality between religion and nonreligion); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225 (agreeing that state
cannot establish "religion of secularism" (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314
(1952))); McConnell, supra note 125, at 33 (asserting that neutrality and secularism are not
identical because secular and religious viewpoints compete); Stephen V. Monsma & 3. Christopher Soper, Introduction to EQUAL TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY,
supra note 125, at 1, 4 (referring to increasing secularism as "community of moral conviction").

EXCLUSION OFRELIGIOUSPROVIDERS

1333

B. Neutrality as a Requirement of EstablishmentClause Tests
The Court has used various tests to determine whether state action
violates the Establishment Clause. 2 4 In articulating two common tests for
determining whether the government has violated the Establishment Clause,
the Court has acknowledged the importance of balance between promoting
and handicapping religion and the importance of nondiscrimination toward
religion. 25 First, as explained below, each prong of the Lemon test promotes
an aspect of neutrality. 1 6 Second, by forbidding the government either to
endorse or to disfavor religion, the endorsement test also creates a balance that
preserves neutrality. 211 Applying the Blaine provisions to prohibit the involve214. See Board of Edue. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720
(1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (stating that in Establishment Clause analysis, Court does not confine itself to single test); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678-79
(same); Laycock, supra note 209, at 999 (claiming doubts that single principle can define
religion clauses). Although the Lemon test appears often throughout Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, see Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment) (criticizing manner in which Lemon test "stalks" Establishment Clause jurisprudence), the Court has
neither applied it consistently nor overruled it Keith A. Wilson, Note, Thou Shalt FundMy
Religious Expression: Neutrality Alone Gores the EstablishmentClause in Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 16 LoY. L. ENT. L.J. 817, 822 (1996). In
fact, in the Court's most recent Establishment Clause case, Justice O'Connor, the proponent of
the endorsement test, looked to the Lemon test. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 218
(1997) (quoting Lemon test).
215. See infra Part IV.B.1 (pointing out neutrality aspects ofLemon test); infra Part IV.B.2
(summarizing neutrality component of endorsement test). Although this Note focuses only on
the Lemon test and the endorsement test, neutrality lurks in other Establishment Clause tests as
well. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598-99 (1992) (applying coercion test and hinting at
balance in Establishment Clause by saying that excluding religion from every area of public life
risks violating Constitution); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (applying strict
scrutiny to discrimination between denominations); Walk, 397 U.S. at 696 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("Neutrality in its application requires an equal protection mode of analysis."). However,
coercion, strict scrutiny, and equal protection as separate tests are beyond the scope of this Note.
In asserting that neutrality is a central principle of the Establishment Clause, this Note
does not intend to discount these other tests or to contend that neutrality alone defines the
Establishment Clause. See Laycock, supra note 209, at 998 (maintaining that neutrality cannot
be sole or most fundamental principle of Establishment Clause). However, perhaps in this case
of excluding religious social service providers from voucher programs, "[n]eutrality is the
easiest way to recognize the problem, to decide the case, and to explain the result." Id. at 999.
216. See Laycock, supra note 120, at 56 (stating that although Lemon test has become
symbol of strict separationism, its roots are in "benevolent neutrality" language of School
District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)); infra Part IV.B.1
(emphasizing neutrality components of Lemon test).
217. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,688 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (stating
that Establishment Clause prohibits government from making individuals feel like insiders or
outsiders based on religious affiliation); infra Part IV.3.2 (discussing neutrality component of
endorsement test).
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ment of religious providers on an equal basis with other independent providers
of social services fails the neutrality principle of both these tests.
1. The Lemon Test andNeutrality
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 1 the Court established a three-prong test for
determining whether governmental action violates the Establishment Clause. 9
The first part of the Lemon test requires that the government have a secular
purpose for its action.22 The states' purpose in applying the Blaine provisions
may be to avoid promoting religion, but because the Establishment Clause
forbids favoring religion or nonreligion, aiding nonreligion at the expense of
religion is an impermissible religious purpose."1 Moreover, the model for the
Blaine provisions itself did not serve a secular purpose; rather, the proposed
218. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
219. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (requiring that statute have
secular purpose, that its primary effect be neither to advance nor to inhibit religion, and that it
not create excessive government entanglement with religion). In Lemon, the Court considered
a challenge to two programs that provided benefits to religious schools. Id. at 607-09. Considering the cumulative criteria of former Establishment Clause eases, the Lemon Court summarized: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster
an excessive government entanglement with religion." Id. at 612-13 (internal quotations and
citations omitted). Examining the first prong, the Court found no legislative intent to advance
religion but rather an intent to improve secular education in all schools. Id. at 613. Declining
to decide whether the primary effect of the programs violated the religion clauses, the Court
found that the relationship between the state and the nonpublic schools involved an excessive
entanglement of the government in religion. Id. 613-14. Therefore, the program was unconstitutional. Id. at 614.
220. See id. at 612 ("First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose .... "). See
generallyMichael.A. Vaccari,PubliePurposeand thePublicFundingofSectarianInstitutions:
A More Rational Approach After Rosenberger and Agostini, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1998)
(proposing public purpose doctrine as revision to Establishment Clause doctrine). In several
Establishment Clause cases, the Court focused on neutrality when applying the Lemon test. Id.
at 36 (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v. Washington
Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v.Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)). In
other recent cases, the Court concentrated on neutrality without even mentioning Lemon. Id.
(citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)).
221. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993) ("A law lacks, facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular
meaning discernable from the language or context."); id. at 542 (finding, under Free Exercise
Clause, that ordinances intended to suppress religion were not neutral toward religion); Church
on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273, 1279 (10th Cir. 1996) (asserting that
restriction prohibiting religious views intrinsically favors secularism at expense of religion);
Volokh, supra note 120, at 12 ("[E]xclusion of religion from even-handed government
benefits.., is in fact a form of discrimination against religion."); supra note 213 (summarizing
prohibition of favoring religion or nonreligion).
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amendment promoted a religious purpose because it resulted from widely
recognized animus towards a religious group.'
The second prong ofthe Lemon test requires that the primary effect of the
program be neither to advance nor to inhibit religion.'m The Court has never
found the "nor inhibit" phrase of this second prong conclusive when evaluating the relationship between religion and secularism 4 but the balance
between the words "advance" and "inhibit" suggests neutrality.2' The effect
of prohibiting religious providers from participating with other independent
providers in a voucher program is to create a disability for religious organizations in the market of social service providers. 6 Furthermore, by creating an
incentive for religious social service providers to alter their religious practices
in order to receive vouchers, the state inhibits and interferes with religion. 7
222. See supra note 50 (explaining anti-Catholic motivation for proposed Blaine Amendment to federal Constitution).
223. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 ("[S]econd, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion .... " (citing Board of Educ. of Cent Sch. Dist. No.
I v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,243 (1968))).
224. See Michael W. McConnell, ReligiousFreedom at a Crossroads,59 U. CiiL L. REV.
115, 118 n.9 (1992) (explaining that only case in which Court applied Establishment Clause to
invalidate inhibition of religion concerned discrimination between denominations, not discrimination against religion (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982))).
225. See Laycock, supra note 209, at 1007 (labeling focus on only one side of balance
between advancing or inhibiting religion as disaggregated neutrality).
226. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,673 (1970) (recognizing that hostilitytoward
religion can take economic form); Board of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 228 N.E.2d
791,794 (N.Y. 1967) ("The so called 'wall of separation' may be built so high and so broad as
to impair both the state and the church .... "), aff'd, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); see also County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 663-64 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) ("[E]nforced recognition of only the secular... would signify ... not neutrality but a pervasive intent
to insulate government from all things religious."); McConnell, supra note 224, at 184 (asserting that excluding religious organization from program providing financial support to nonprofit
sector creates penalty for religion). It is unclear whether a court would find the inhibition of
religion to be the primary effect of an exclusion of religious providers. However, in Agostini,
the Court notably omitted the word."primary" from its statement of the test. See Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223 (1997) ("[We continue to explore whether the aid has the 'effect'
of advancing or inhibiting religion.").
227. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997) (considering, as part of Lemon's
second prong, whether program "give[s] aid recipients any incentive to modify their religious
beliefs or practices in order to obtain those services"); School Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (asserting that fullest realization
of religious liberty requires that government not deter or compel religious beliefs); Columbia
Union College v. Clarke, 159 F.3d 151,177 (4th Cir. 1998) (Wilkinson, C.., dissenting) ("IT]he
president of Columbia Union College asked, 'If we recant, would we qualify?' ... The only
way [the college] could receive such aid is by compromising or abandoning its religious views.
That to me is impermissible inhibition of religion, impermissible discrimination under our
Constitution's religion clauses . . . ."), cerL denied, 119 S. Ct. 2357 (1999); Brief for Amici
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The third prong of the Lemon test prohibits excessive entanglement
between the government and religion.228 In various cases dealing with parochial schools, the Court has suggested that excluding a religious school from
a program in fact might create greater entanglement between the government
and religion than includingit.229 This entanglement would arise from the government's monitoring the religious content of schools' speech.23 ° The same
argument applies to social service voucher programs: A government inquiry
to determine whether an organization is "religious" would create greater
entanglement between the entity and the government than would neutrality
toward its religious character. 3 ' Therefore, each prong of the Lemon test
requires the inclusion of religious providers according to the same neutral
criteria as other social service providers.
2. The EndorsementTest andNeutrality
Justice O'Connor's articulation of the endorsement test is a second
Establishment Clause standard. 1 2 Although the Court never has repudiated
Curiaeof Christian Legal Society, et al., at 31, Columbia Union College (No. 97-2565) ("The
First Amendment does not permit the government to use the public fise as a lever to 'buy out'
a college's constitutional rights." (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819 (1995))); Laycock, supranote 120, at 71 (explaining that if government pays only for
secular soup kitchen, it creates powerful incentive to secularize).
228. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) ("[F]inally, the statute must not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."' (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 674 (1970))). InAgostini v. Felton, the Court collapsed the three-part Lemon test into
two questions, asking whether the purpose or the effect of government action was to advance
or to inhibit religion. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222-23. However, it addressed the entanglement
prong as part of the effect question. See id.at 232 ("[T]he factors we use to assess whether an
entanglement is 'excessive' are similar to the factors we use to examine 'effect."').
229. See Board ofEduc. of the Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,253
(1990) (plurality) (asserting possibility of greater entanglement if government denied equal
access to religious groups and monitored student meetings to prevent religious speech); Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272 n.11 (1981) (finding risk of greater entanglement if university
tried to enforce exclusion of religious worship and speech); see also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620
(suggesting that excessive monitoring by state to ensure separation of secular and sectarian
activities would result in unconstitutional entanglement and intrusion of religion), cited in
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233.
230. See supra note 229 (citing cases asserting greater entanglement would result from
prohibition of religion).
231. See Columbia Union College, 159 F.3d at 175 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (asserting
that lengthy trial considering religious character of college "denigrates the very values underlying our Constitution's religion clauses"); Esbeck, supra note 7, at 15-16 (asserting that inquiry
into degree of religiosity of organizations results in deep entanglement).
232. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 772-83
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (applying endorsement
test); Board of Educ. of KIryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (stating that government cannot
make individual's religion relevant to standing in political community); County of Allegheny

EXCLUSION OFRELIGIOUS PROVIDERS

1337

the Lemon test, 3 seven Justices have indicated approval of the endorsement
test . 3 4 Under the endorsement test, government endorsement or disapproval
of religion violates the Establishment Clause.235 By endorsing or disfavoring
religion, the government makes religion relevant to a person's standing in the
community.3 Governmental disapproval of rdligion communicates to the
public that adherents of religion "are outsiders, not full members of the political community," and that nonadherents "are insiders, favored members of the
political community. ' " If an examination of the government's purpose in
excluding religious groups demonstrates an intent to communicate endorsement or disapproval of religion, or if an analysis of the effect of the exclusion
reveals the actual conveyance of a message of endorsement
or disapproval, the
38
challenged government action is unconstitutional
v.ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,625-37 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring injudgment) (utilizing endorsement test); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,687-94 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (articulating endorsement test).
233. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,218 (1997) (relying on Lemon test); Wilson,
supra note 214, at 822 (stating that Court has not overruled Lemon test). However, the Justices
repeatedly have expressed dissatisfaction with the Lemon test. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist, 508 U.S. 384, 398-99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (observing that five of Justices sitting in 1993 had written opinions that criticized Lemon
and that another had concurred in such opinion (citations omitted)).
234. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 767-69 (plurality) (expressing approval of four Justices for
applying endorsement test to government actions); id. at 774 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment) (expressing approval of three Justices for applying endorsement
test to private religious conduct as well as to direct government speech); Wilson, supra note
214, at 822 n.48 (stating that in Pinette, two groups of Justices - Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer expressed approval for endorsement test but disagreed on its applicability to private speech);
see also County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 594 (agreeing that Establishment Clause at least
prohibits government from making adherence to religion relevant to standing in political community (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
235. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688, 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (focusing on whether
government communicates message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion); see
also Shivakumar, supra note 159, at 521 (summarizing cases in which Court has ruled that government cannot disfavor religion in general, such as by excluding religion from government
programs and benefits (citing Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981))).
236. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that by endorsing
religion, government can violate Establishment Clause's prohibition against making religion
relevant to political standing).
237. See id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.
Disapproval sends the opposite message."); see also Pinette, 515 U.S. at 773 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (same).
238. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating
that purpose or effect of endorsing or disapproving religion invalidates challenged practice).
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A state's refusal to allow individuals to redeem their social service
vouchers with religious providers simply because ofthe religious character of
the providers would send a message of endorsement of nonreligion and of
disapproval of religion. 9 A categorical exclusion of all religious social
service providers from state voucher programs would communicate that those
providers are inherently inferior by nature of their religious viewpoint; it
thereby would imply that the viewpoint of the religious providers and their
beneficiaries is itself inferior to the viewpoints of nonreligious providers.24
Prohibiting participation by religious providers when all others are eligible not
only risks making religious adherents feel like "outsiders," it also effectively
makes religious providers "outsiders" to the program.24 Therefore, the use of
Blaine provisions to exclude religious providers from state voucher systems
violates the endorsement test as well as the Lemon test.
V Conclusion
The above analysis leads to the conclusion that the federal Constitution
not only allows but also requires the state to extend eligibility to religious
providers if it uses state funds to create a social service voucher program. To
exclude religious providers because of a state constitutional provision violates
the neutrality that both the Free Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause
require. Therefore, the federal Constitution preempts the state Blame provisions in this context.
The exclusion of religious providers from state programs has additional
implications beyond the constitutional questions that barring religious social
service providers from state voucher programs raises. First, excluding religious providers from welfare programs has practical implications for welfare
reform. The movement toward greater cooperation between states and religious social service providers is likely to continue because of support for the
expansion of Charitable Choice and its nondiscrimination principle.242 Ex239. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 846 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that denying funds to religious group would create impermissible impression that government disfavors religious activities); Brief for Burr, et al., &
Gamett, et al., as Amidi Curiae at 28, Board of Educ. of the Westside Community Schs. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (No. 88-1597) (stating that expert witness testified that students
would perceive hostility toward religion in school's excluding religious club).
240. See supra notes 232-39 and accompanying text (setting out endorsement test).
241. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that disapproval sends
message to adherents that they are outsiders and not full members of community); cf Columbia
Union College v. Clarke, 119 S. Ct 2357, 2358 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (labeling disadvantage imposed by excluding religious college from government program "invidious religious discrimination").
242. See Charitable Choice Expansion Act of 1999, S. 1113, 106th Cong. (prohibiting
"discrimination against nongovernmental organizations and certain individuals on the basis of
religion in the distribution of government funds to provide government assistance and distribu-
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cluding religious providers not only defeats the nondiscrimination purpose of
Charitable Choice but also frustrates Congress's broader intent to involve
religious providers in the delivery of social services.2 43 Moreover, because
religious providers of social services have met with much success and because
many independent-sector social service providers are religious, the Blaine
provisions' discrimination against religious providers eliminates a valuable
resource for welfare reform. 2' Second, the question of the constitutionality
of excluding religious providers has both practical and constitutional implications in the area of education reform. As briefly mentioned above, many
opponents of school choice have raised Blaine provisions in opposition to that
movement.24 Therefore, the scenario at the beginning of this Note outlining
a state legislature's dilemma in trying to reconcile state constitutional standards with the federal Constitution is not merely hypothetically foreseeable,
it is imminently foreseeable. Soon the courts will have to address the inherent
conflict between First Amendment principles and the Blaine provisions'
exclusion of religious organizations from general government programs.

tion of the assistance"); 145 CONG. REc. S5954-55 (daily ed. May 25,1999) (statement of Sen.
John Ashcroft) (explaining that Charitable Choice Expansion Act would apply to all federal
government programs in which government may utilize nongovernmental organizations in providing federally funded services); Gore Remarks, supra note 6 (advocating extending approach
of Charitable Choice to other services).
243. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (stating that purpose of Charitable Choice
is to allow participation on nondiscriminatory basis while at same time to preserve religious freedom ofproviders and recipients); supra note 14 and accompanying text (summarizing efforts and
intent of Congress to encourage state cooperation with religious providers in welfare reform).
244. See Esbeck, supra note 7, at 39 (asserting that involving independent sector in welfare
reform is essential because faith-based nonprofits, which make up significant part of voluntary
sector, have achieved considerable success); supra note 7 and accompanying text (asserting success of faith-based social services).
245. See Viteritti, supra note 35, at 659 ("In the end, the fate of school choice will turn on
the willingness of the Supreme Court to impose its own constitutional guidelines upon the
States in order to protect the free-exercise rights of individuals."); supra note 49 and accompanying text (mentioning that several state courts have already addressed state constitutional provisions raised in opposition to school choice).

